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ABSTRACT	
		 The	history	of	transportation	planning	in	New	York	City	has	created	disparities	between	those	who	have	sufficient	access	to	the	public	transportation	network,	and	those	who	face	structural	barriers	to	traveling	from	their	home	to	education,	employment,	and	healthcare	opportunities.	This	thesis	analyzes	the	legacy	of	discriminatory	policy	surrounding	the	Metropolitan	Transportation	Authority	(MTA)	and	city	and	state	governments	that	have	failed	to	support	vital	infrastructure	improvement	projects	and	service	changes	to	provide	multi-modal	welfare	to	New	York’s	working	poor.	By	exploring	issues	of	transit	equity	as	they	pertain	to	the	New	York	City	subway	system,	this	thesis	raises	the	question:	which	communities	lack	adequate	access	to	public	transit	opportunity	and	what	are	the	policies	and	historical	developments	that	have	created	these	inequities?	Through	examination	of	grassroots	community-based	movements	towards	social	justice	and	transportation	equity,	this	thesis	will	review	the	proposals,	campaigns,	and	demands	that	citizen-driven	organizations	have	fought	for	in	New	York	City.	These	movements,	I	argue,	are	the	most	effective	method	to	achieve	greater	transportation	justice	and	intergenerational	equity.																														
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INTRODUCTION	
	
“Urban	transit	systems	in	most	American	cities	have	become	a	genuine	civil	rights	issue	–	and	
a	valid	one	–	because	the	layout	of	rapid-transit	systems	determines	the	accessibility	of	jobs	to	
the	black	community.	If	transportation	systems	in	American	cities	could	be	laid	out	so	as	to	
provide	an	opportunity	for	poor	people	to	get	to	meaningful	employment,	then	they	could	
begin	to	move	into	the	mainstream	of	American	life.	The	system	has	virtually	no	consideration	
for	connecting	the	poor	people	with	their	jobs.	There	is	only	one	possible	explanation	for	this	
situation,	and	that	is	the	racist	blindness	of	city	planners”	–	Dr.	Martin	Luther	King	Jr.		
	Public	transportation	is	often	referred	to	as	the	great	equalizer	of	public	resources.	Providing	access	to	various	opportunities	such	as	employment,	education,	healthcare,	and	so	on,	mass	transit	offers	the	most	equitable	mode	of	transportation	for	those	who	cannot	afford	an	automobile.	Although	mass	transit	is	widely	accepted	as	offering	equal	opportunity	to	all,	that	is	hardly	the	reality.	In	practice,	public	transportation	agencies	have	often	employed	for-profit	business	mindsets,	prioritizing	the	bottom	line	over	the	needs	of	transit-disadvantaged	populations.	This	thesis	argues	that	the	access	offered	by	public	transportation	is	not	distributed	equally	amongst	all	socioeconomic	groups,	and	policy	decisions	made	by	transit	agencies,	urban	planners,	and	politicians	have	perpetuated	discriminatory	practices	that	have	made	mass	transit	increasingly	inaccessible	and	unaffordable	for	low-income	communities.	With	a	focus	on	the	New	York	City	subway	system,	this	thesis	argues	that	the	Metropolitan	Transportation	Authority,	the	state-operated	governing	body	for	NYC	public	transit,	views	its	riders	as	consumers	rather	than	as	citizens,	privileging	New	Yorkers	with	varied	transit	options.	I	claim	that	historical	developments	in	the	decades	following	WWII,	such	as	urban	renewal,	slum	clearance,	and	federal	housing	policies	that	promoted	suburbanization,	highway	development,	and	white	flight,	segregated	New	York	and	marginalized	low-income	residents	and	communities	of	color	to	the	fringe	of	the	city,	devoid	of	adequate	transit	access.	I	postulate	that	by	not	
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expanding	service	to	meet	the	needs	of	transit-disadvantaged	communities,	the	MTA	and	the	New	York	City	government	have	employed	discriminatory	public	transportation	policies.	These	inequities	have	been	exacerbated	by	an	influx	of	gentrification	over	the	last	three	decades,	facilitated	in	part	by	politicians	who	aided	the	interest	of	real	estate	developers.	This	thesis	will	conclude	by	reviewing	the	advocacy	of	grassroots	transit	equity	community	organizations,	which	I	argue	is	the	most	effective	strategy	to	fight	for	transportation	justice.		For	millions	of	urban	residents,	public	transportation	is	the	only	means	of	traversing	the	city.	As	a	critical	means	to	address	urban	poverty	and	racial	and	economic	inequality,	good	transportation	policies	can	be	a	critical	difference	maker	between	a	legitimate	opportunity	for	disenfranchised	opportunities	to	achieve	upward	mobility,	or	a	continued	legacy	of	economic	stagnation	and	systematic	oppression.	The	movement	for	transportation	equity,	the	basic	right	to	adequate	access	to	a	transportation	network,	is	a	manifestation	of	a	larger	movement	for	civil	rights	and	environmental	justice.	In	Highway	
Robbery:	Transportation	Racism	and	New	Routes	to	Equity,	renowned	environmental	justice	scholar	Robert	Bullard	argues	that	transportation	policy	has	created	an	opaque	narrative:	that	transportation	investment	projects	have	aided	and	abetted	the	flight	of	people,	jobs,	and	development	to	the	suburban	fringe	(R.	Bullard,	Johnson,	and	Torres	2004).		This	research	is	concerned	with	the	impact	that	lacking	public	transportation	access	imposes	onto	a	community.	In	my	opinion,	no	analysis	of	urban	transit	in	the	United	States	is	complete	without	a	consideration	for	how	public	services	benefit	communities	in	different	ways.	Our	social	standing	has	determined	where	we	live;	influencing	the	amount	of	access	we	have	to	good	education	and	employment,	ultimately	dictating	our	ability	for	
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upward	mobility.	Inequalities	in	the	transit	system	are	directly	a	product	of	decisions	made	in	the	political	and	planning	realms,	and	it	is	critical	that	scholars	and	practioners	alike	study	these	legacies	in	order	to	plan	for	a	more	equitable	future.		Transit	inequities	in	New	York	City	are	created	and	reinforced	by	a	subway	and	bus	network	that	fails	to	provide	adequate	service	to	various	communities,	hereby	called	‘transit	deserts’,	and	a	regularly	increasing	fare	that	is	cost-prohibitive	for	the	working	poor,	who	often	must	choose	between	the	current	round-trip	subway	or	bus	cost	of	$5.50	and	putting	food	on	the	table	for	their	families.	In	a	city	where	58%	of	the	working	poor	rely	on	subways	and	buses	to	get	to	work	and	one	in	four	low-income	New	Yorkers	cannot	afford	its	cost	(Community	Service	Society	2016a),	there	is	clearly	something	wrong.		Robert	Bullard	describes	the	impact	that	transportation	projects	can	have	onto	marginalized	communities,	“many	federally	subsidized	transportation	construction	and	infrastructure	projects	cut	wide	paths	through	low-income	and	people	of	color	neighborhoods.	They	physically	isolate	residents	from	their	institutions	and	businesses,	disrupt	once-stable	communities,	displace	thriving	businesses,	contribute	to	urban	sprawl,	subsidize	infrastructure	decline,	create	traffic	gridlock,	and	subject	residents	to	elevated	risks	from	accidents,	spills,	and	explosions	from	vehicles	carrying	hazardous	chemicals	and	other	dangerous	materials,”	(R.	Bullard,	Johnson,	and	Torres	2004).		The	shift	of	federal	transportation	policy	in	the	1950s	from	supporting	public	transportation	to	highway	projects	was	a	radical	transformation	that	has	plagued	low-income	and	people	of	color	communities.	For	instance,	the	neighborhood	of	Sunset	Park,	Brooklyn,	was	completely	transformed	by	the	creation	of	the	Brooklyn-Battery	Tunnel	in	1950,	a	project	pushed	by	notorious	master	builder	Robert	Moses.	Insisting	that	Sunset	
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Park	was	“a	slum”	that	was	not	particularly	worth	saving,	Moses	redirected	trucks	coming	out	of	the	newly	created	tunnel	onto	Sunset	Park’s	Third	Avenue,	which	was	for	decades	the	heart	of	Sunset	Park’s	cultural	activities	(R.	Bullard,	Johnson,	and	Torres	2004).	Moses	also	reclassified	the	Gowanus	Parkway	as	an	expressway	(a	component	of	the	Brooklyn-Queens	Expressway,	or	BQE,	as	it	is	known	today),	and	by	doing	so	widened	the	expressway	right	up	to	the	windows	of	residences.	As	a	result	of	policies	that	privileged	automobile	and	truck	traffic,	Sunset	Park	experienced	a	significant	decline	throughout	the	1950s	and	into	the	1960s.	Along	with	the	federal	housing	policies	that	encouraged	redlining	and	denied	loans	to	people	of	color,	the	transportation	policies	of	the	postwar	decades	had	a	devastating	impact	on	reducing	social	services	and	welfare	in	New	York	City.		In	addition	to	the	many	physical	barriers	that	inner-city	highways	have	created,	this	shift	in	transit	priorities	has	led	to	significant	cutbacks	in	mass	transit	subsides	that	have	further	isolated	disadvantaged	communities,	leading	to	severe	immobility	and	unemployment,	resulting	in	intergenerational	economic	stagnation.	This	dichotomy	of	transit	access	has	formed	a	system	of	disproportionate	transit	impacts,	referred	to	by	transit	scholars	Karen	Lucas	and	Peter	Jones	as	‘transit	goods’	and	‘transit	bads’	(Lucas	and	Jones	2012).	The	wealthiest	members	of	society	receive	‘transit	goods’,	such	as	high	speed	rail,	modern	highways,	ample	transit	options	with	superior	service.	Meanwhile	the	poorest	and	socially	disadvantaged	groups	suffer	‘transit	bads’,	the	burden	of	structural	barriers	in	the	built	environment,	inadequate	transportation	options,	poor	service,	and	externalities	such	as	exhaust	fumes	from	cars	and	tractor	trailers	bellowing	through	communities	on	elevated	freeways.	
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This	thesis	will	explore	the	histories	of	urban	planning	policy	that	has	created	a	disproportionate	system	of	access	to	the	public	transportation	network	in	New	York	City,	and	will	examine	the	ways	in	which	transit	inequity	exists	in	the	NYC	subway	network	today.	By	reviewing	contemporary	literature	in	the	transportation	equity	scholarship,	and	assessing	how	these	inequities	manifest	themselves	in	the	history	of	the	NYC	subway,	this	thesis	raises	the	question:	why	does	the	subway	privilege	access	for	some	communities,	but	leave	others	without	sufficient	transportation	opportunity	and	access	to	the	city?	To	investigate	this	issue,	I	will	explore	the	policies	and	history	of	racist	public	policy,	income	inequality,	residential	segregation	exacerbated	by	white	flight,	and	gentrification,	which	have	segregated	various	communities	on	divisions	of	race	and	class.	I	will	also	assess	current	movements	and	case	studies	of	how	community	organizations	are	fighting	for	transportation	justice,	pressuring	transit	agencies	to	implement	progressive	fare	structures	that	level	the	playing	field	for	the	working	poor,	while	also	suggesting	ways	to	involve	underrepresented	communities	in	the	planning	process.	By	exploring	issues	of	transportation	equity,	this	thesis	will	analyze	what	are	the	powers	that	dictate	our	urban	public	transportation	networks,	and	how	these	actors	can	adjust	their	polices	to	have	the	New	York	City	subway	system	provide	service	that	better	meets	the	needs	of	populations	that	need	it	most.		Chapter	One	will	begin	by	reviewing	the	critical	literature	surrounding	transportation	justice,	accessibility,	and	equity.	Chapter	Two	assesses	the	history	of	the	development	of	the	New	York	City	subway,	analyzing	its	inheritance	from	private	corporate	ownership	to	publicly	governed	city	oversight	and	finally	a	state-governed	authority.	Chapter	Three	revolves	around	the	post-WWII	developments	such	as	the	boom	of	the	
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automobile	industry,	rapid	suburbanization,	the	construction	of	urban	freeways,	and	urban	renewal	programs,	that	segregated	New	York	City	along	barriers	of	race	and	class.	Chapter	Four	considers	the	impact	of	post	1990s	economic	recession	gentrification	on	the	isolation	of	the	working	poor,	leading	to	economic	stagnation.	This	chapter	also	analyzes	the	recent	changes	in	employment	patterns	in	New	York	during	the	1990s	and	early	2000s,	with	significant	job	growth	in	the	outer	boroughs	that	have	made	the	periphery	to	core	mentality	of	the	NYC	subway	inadequate	for	many.	Chapter	Five	discusses	several	citizen-driven	grassroots	community	organizations	that	advocate	for	transit	equity	in	New	York	City,	and	reviews	the	proposals	and	demands	put	forth	by	these	groups	to	democratize	the	transportation	system.	A	conclusion	will	bring	together	the	histories,	key	literature	and	contemporary	movements	related	to	public	transportation	justice	in	New	York	City,	and	provide	suggestions	for	how	urban	planners	and	city	officials	can	plan	future	projects	in	a	fairer	and	more	just	manner.		 By	writing	this	thesis	paper,	I	hope	to	contribute	to	the	ample	body	of	transportation	equity	literature	worldwide,	as	well	as	the	vast	history	of	urban	planning	in	New	York	City,	to	incite	future	conversations	on	how	the	built	environment	dictates	a	person’s	ability	to	obtain	good	education,	employment	and	a	fruitful	life.	New	York	City’s	transit	system	is	the	most	comprehensive	of	its	kind	in	the	United	States,	and	in	many	ways	is	indeed	the	great	equalizer,	but	it	could	be	so	much	better.	Various	policies	at	the	city	and	state	level	have	prevented	the	subway	from	expanding	into	communities	that	need	it,	and	a	lack	of	financial	support	at	each	level	of	government,	which	has	led	to	increased	fares	–	making	New	York	public	transit	cost	prohibitive	for	many	working	New	Yorkers	today.			 	
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REVIEW	OF	THE	LITERATURE		 Various	scholars	have	explored	the	relationship	between	the	planning	of	transportation	infrastructure	in	the	built	environment,	and	barriers	communities	face	to	good	education	and	employment.	This	lack	of	parity	in	public	transportation	opportunity	and	access	is	referred	to	in	the	transportation	literature	as	“transportation	justice”.	Transportation	Justice	has	been	referred	to	as	the	expansion	of	environmental	justice	principles	to	transportation	issues,	exploring	mobility,	access,	and	modal	opportunity,	with	regards	to	how	urban	transportation	networks	provide	unequal	opportunities	for	people	to	travel	to	essential	locales	such	as	school,	work,	and	healthcare	facilities.			 This	chapter	seeks	to	identify	the	key	literature	pertaining	to	transportation	equity,	justice,	and	just	urban	planning	processes.	I	will	first	review	key	scholars	who	investigate	a	history	of	discriminatory	transportation	policies	that	have	produced	disproportionate	levels	of	access	to	the	city.	Then,	I	will	analyze	scholars’	definitions	of	transportation	justice.	The	following	section	will	explore	theories	of	equity	and	justice	as	they	pertain	to	planning	processes	of	urban	transportation	systems.	In	particular,	I	spend	time	reviewing	the	work	of	authors	who	suggest	what	an	equitable	distribution	of	transit	services	may	look	like,	and	what	reforms	transit	agencies	must	employ	to	achieve	a	sense	of	distributive	justice.		Across	various	urban	settings,	scholars	have	identified	many	burdens	that	transportation	justice	issues	can	impose	onto	a	community.	Bullard	(2004)	argues	that	white	racism	in	transportation	policy	has	denied	many	black	Americans	and	other	people	of	color	the	benefits,	freedoms,	opportunities,	and	rewards	that	public	transportation	offers	to	white	Americans.	Pucher	(1982)	contends	that	transportation	authorities	regard	
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low-income	patrons	as	a	‘captive	market’,	for	whom	financial	restraints	force	these	communities	to	rely	on	transit	systems	regardless	of	the	quality	of	service	they	are	provided.		Urban	transportation	researchers	have	provided	definitions	for	transportation	justice,	accessibility,	and	equity,	and	have	suggested	methods	to	properly	diversify	transit	agencies	to	plan	equitable	systems.	Wee	and	Geurs	(2011)	maintain	that	a	system	built	on	the	principles	of	sufficientarianism	would	require	planning	considerations	to	provide	the	best	service	for	those	with	the	lowest	welfare,	alleviating	the	systematic	disadvantages	that	current	transit	structures	pose.	Fainstein	(2010)	introduces	the	concept	of	‘the	just	city’,	calling	to	rectify	injustices	in	a	world	where	control	of	investment	resources	by	a	small	stratum	constantly	re-creates	and	reinforces	subordination.	Gössling	(2016)	builds	off	Fainstein’s	philosophy,	contending	that	cities	must	embrace	concepts	of	equity,	democracy,	and	diversity	to	overcome	neoliberalism	and	allocate	resources	in	a	fair	and	just	manner.	These	authors	argue	for	a	deliberative	democracy	approach	that	necessitates	full	participation	of	subordinated	groups,	facilitating	a	healthy	civic	community	where	citizens	talk	to	one	another,	exchanging	ideas	and	devising	new	understandings	of	how	to	plan	transportation	networks	that	provide	opportunities	for	all.			
Discrimination	in	Public	Transportation	Transportation	scholars	and	civil	rights	activists	have	discussed	the	role	that	access	to	a	good,	comprehensive	transportation	network	provides	to	a	society.	In	particular,	authors	have	sought	to	contextualize	the	social	impact	of	discriminatory	transportation	policies	and	inadequate	access	lead	to	social	exclusion	and	subjugation.	In	his	book	
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Highway	Robbery:	Transportation	Racism	and	New	Routes	to	Equity	(2004),	sociologist	Robert	Bullard	argues	that	transportation-related	decisions	have	been	shaped	by	white	racism.	Bullard	argues	that	national	transportation	infrastructure	has	denied	many	black	Americans	and	other	people	of	color	the	benefits,	freedoms,	opportunities,	and	rewards	offered	to	white	Americans.	Further,	he	asserts	that	many	of	the	economic	problems	that	persist	in	urban	areas	involving	a	lack	of	mobility	could	be	eliminated	if	existing	transportation	laws	were	vigorously	reformed	in	a	nondiscriminatory	way.	Bullard	identifies	several	structural	barriers	that	have	prevented	people	of	color	from	achieving	parity	in	urban	transportation	networks.	Bullard	distinguishes	racist	priorities	in	transportation	investment	funding,	white	flight,	lack	of	representation	on	transportation	boards	and	commissions,	and	disproportionate	allocation	of	transportation	benefits	as	being	main	factors	leading	to	transport-related	discrimination.		 Urban	sociologist	John	Pucher	(1982)	asserts	that	inequities	in	transportation	services	can	be	traced	to	economic	policies	of	transit	agencies,	which	have	treated	riders	as	consumers	rather	than	as	citizens.	Pucher	argues	that	these	agencies	inherited	their	economic	structure	from	their	previous	development	and	ownership	by	private	corporations.	When	public	transit	systems	were	privately	owned,	such	as	the	New	York	City	subway,	their	services	and	fare	structures	were	designed	to	maximize	profits	and	minimize	losses.			 In	his	1982	study,	Discrimination	in	Mass	Transit,	Pucher	asserts	that	contemporary	transportation	agencies	have	sought	to	prioritize	the	maximization	of	total	transit	ridership.	He	claims	that	in	order	to	do	this,	the	optimal	economic	strategy	would	be	to	offer	the	best	services	and	discounted	fares	to	those	customers	with	elastic	demand	and	
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varied	transit	options,	and	to	discriminate	against	those	who	have	fewer	transit	options	by	providing	them	with	lower	quality	service	at	premium	fares	(Pucher	1982).	“It	has	been	widely	hypothesized	that	transit	systems	have	in	fact	tended	to	regard	their	low-income	patrons	as	a	captive	market.	Due	to	financial	constraints	and	auto	unavailability,	these	disadvantaged	riders	could	be	counted	on	in	spite	of	poor	service	and	inequitably	high	fares,”	Pucher	asserted.	According	to	a	recent	study	by	Ravit	Hananel	and	Joseph	Berechman	(2016),	transport	investment	decisions	depend	fully	on	the	model	of	supply	and	demand,	where	their	underlying	principle	was	the	theory	that	free	markets	should	be	dictated	by	consumer	preferences,	and	therefore	the	responsibility	of	agencies	is	to	meet	consumer	demand	for	transportation	with	appropriate	infrastructure	and	service	(Hananel	and	Berechman	2016).	By	using	the	economic	theory	of	supply	and	demand,	transit	authorities	are	prioritizing	the	generation	of	economic	capital,	and	are	providing	superior	service	to	those	with	more	transportation	choices	rather	than	serving	those	who	need	the	service	most.			 Sociologists	Mark	Garrett	and	Brian	Taylor	(1999)	have	argued	that,	in	addition	to	being	morally	unjust	and	discriminatory,	this	financial	model	of	viewing	those	who	rely	on	public	transit	the	most	as	‘transit	captives’	and	prioritizing	those	with	ample	transit	options	is	economically	inefficient.	Garrett	and	Taylor	identify	four	factors	for	why	transit	agencies	have	prioritized	policy	that	attracts	riders	who	would	otherwise	commute	in	cars,	rather	than	for	those	who	need	transit	most.	These	influences	include	public	pressures	to	alleviate	traffic	congestion,	environmental	regulations	to	improve	air	quality,	civic	competition	for	limited	fiscal	resources,	and	a	changing	political	landscape	making	it	difficult	to	implement	redistributive	social	programs	(Garrett	and	Taylor	1999).		
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Garrett	and	Taylor	maintain	that	public	pressures,	such	as	alleviating	car	traffic	congestion,	reducing	automobile	dependency,	and	improving	air	quality,	have	impacted	transportation	policy	and	decision-making.	They	claim	that	transit	agencies	have	prioritized	converting	suburban	automobile	commuters	to	opt	for	rail,	bus,	and	other	public	transportation	options	as	a	top	priority.	They	argue	that	in	order	to	provide	attractive	alternatives	to	automobile	commuting,	transit	operators	must	offer	substantial	incentives	to	sway	citizens	with	various	travel	options,	which	requires	expensive	public	investments	in	infrastructure	improvement	projects	for	suburban	communities,	and	in	turn	diverts	funding	away	from	necessary	renovations	and	service	upgrades	for	those	who	are	more	dependent	on	public	transportation	(Garrett	and	Taylor	1999).	This	diversion	of	funds	was	particularly	troublesome	in	the	New	York	metropolitan	area	in	the	postwar	period	of	the	1950s	and	1960s,	where	mass	transit	was	relegated	to	a	position	of	secondary	importance	to	the	automobile	and	urban	freeway	projects.	It	is	also	evident	in	more	recent	investment	priorities,	which	favor	suburban	commuter	rail	over	urban	transit.			
Defining	Transportation	Justice		In	an	attempt	to	identify	the	impacts	that	disproportionate	mobility	can	have	on	a	community,	transportation	scholars	have	coined	the	term,	Transportation	Justice,	to	refer	to	the	social	inequities	that	transportation	policy	creates	and	reinforces.	Authors	Michelle	Oswald	Beiler	and	Mona	Mohammed	(2016)	define	transportation	justice	as	“the	expansion	of	environmental	justice	principles	to	transportation	through	investigating	mobility,	access,	and	modal	opportunity”	(Oswald	Beiler	and	Mohammed	2016).	Beiler	and	Mohammed	argue	that	low-income,	minority,	and	transportation	constrained	communities	are	
	 17	
disproportionately	burdened	by	transportation	development	projects,	and	seldom	receive	parity	in	the	benefits	of	public	transportation.	Examples	of	this	include	the	sitting	of	freeways,	which	are	disproportionately	located	in	low-income	communities,	and	the	prioritization	of	commuter	rail	development.	Scholars	Sarah	Rock,	Aoife	Ahern,	and	Brain	Caulfield	(2013)	add	to	the	definition	of	transportation	justice,	referring	to	transportation-related	equity	to	be	a	form	of	distributive	justice.	Rock,	Ahern	and	Caulfield	define	distributive	justice	as	“the	fair	distribution	of	transport	impacts	(benefits	and	costs)	throughout	all	sectors	of	society.	Swedish	transit	scholar	Stefan	Gössling	defines	urban	transportation	justice	as	“an	achievement	of	greater	equality	or	the	abolishment	of	injustices”,	which	he	refers	to	as	the	disproportionate	burdens	that	a	lack	of	decent	transportation	places	onto	a	community.		A	2012	study	by	Transportation	Scholars	Karen	Lucas	and	Peter	Jones	identified	the	concept	of	transport	‘goods	and	bads’,	the	uneven	disproportionate	impacts	of	public	transportation	on	advantaged	and	disadvantaged	groups	in	society.	They	argue	that	the	wealthiest	in	society	tend	to	gain	the	most	benefits	from	public	transportation,	while	transit	dependents,	those	who	need	public	transportation	most,	suffer	the	systems’	worst	effects.	Lucas	and	Jones	claim	that	this	uneven	distribution	further	subjugates	transit	dependents,	impairing	people’s	ability	to	fully	participate	in	society,	possibly	leading	to	social	exclusion	and	isolation	(Lucas	and	Jones	2012).	Some	scholars	have	recently	attempted	to	measure	this	subjugation,	though	no	formal	method	of	evaluating	transit-related	equity	exists	(Chakraborty	2006)	(Rock,	Ahern,	and	Caulfield	2014).			 Other	studies	have	evaluated	the	sociological	impacts	of	these	transit	decisions	on	a	community.	In	his	2012	paper,	Social	networks,	mobile	lives	and	social	inequalities,	British	
	 18	
sociologist	John	Urry	builds	upon	the	notion	of	social	capital	as	a	transportation	justice	issue,	describing	how	low	levels	of	‘network	capital’	and	transport	resources	can	lead	to	low	social	capital	and	the	exacerbation	of	existing	social	inequalities.	Urry	defines	network	capital	as	“the	capacity	to	engender	and	sustain	social	relations	with	those	people	who	are	not	necessarily	proximate	and	which	generates	emotional,	financial,	and	practical	benefit.”	Without	the	potential	of	network	capital	through	a	just	public	transportation	system,	individuals	are	deprived	of	the	ability	to	create,	circulate	and	share	tacit	knowledge,	and	are	therefore	unable	to	access	new	social	capital	(Urry,	2012).	Thus,	the	issues	of	transportation	justice	are	far	beyond	a	community’s	lack	of	subway	stations	or	the	ease	to	travel	quickly	to	work,	and	are	instead	a	complex	amalgam	of	physical,	social,	geospatial	and	psychological	factors	intertwined	to	produce	structural	inequalities	that	plague	TJ	communities	for	generations.			
Transportation	Decision-Making		 The	disproportionate	levels	of	access	that	transportation	systems	provide	communities	are	the	product	of	deliberate	planning	processes	of	transit	agencies.	Scholars	have	argued	that	many	of	these	agencies	fail	to	properly	mediate	the	social	justice	impacts	of	disproportionate	mobility,	as	transportation	investment	decisions	have	continuously	been	made	by	a	small	group	of	officials,	many	of	whom	are	not	informed	of	the	plight	that	transportation	justice	communities	endure.	The	following	section	identifies	the	relevant	sociological	and	philosophical	theories	that	help	to	inform	transit	agencies	on	just	planning	practices.	
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Various	recent	studies	have	explored	the	social,	political	and	economic	conditions	that	factor	into	transit	agency	planning	and	decision-making.	Karel	Martens	(2006),	a	Dutch	researcher	of	urban	development,	contends	that	transport	policy	remains	ill	equipped	to	mediate	the	social	justice	concerns	of	disproportionate	mobility,	given	that	transportation	policies	have	progressively	exacerbated	the	problems	they	have	caused	through	continued	inappropriate	infrastructure	investments	and	decision-making	processes	(C.	Martens	2006).	In	the	case	of	New	York	City,	this	was	particularly	evident	in	the	postwar	policies	of	urban	renewal	and	slum	clearance,	in	which	Robert	Moses	dedicated	city	resources	to	highway	development	and	suburbanization,	and	consequentially	left	urban	neighborhoods	underserved	and	neglected.		Other	scholars	are	more	optimistic	of	the	potential	for	reform	in	transportation	planning	processes.	Jones	and	Lucas	(2012)	identify	five	short-term	social	impacts	on	transport	decision-making:	accessibility;	movement	and	activities;	health-related;	financial-related;	and	community-related.	Accessibility	to	public	transportation	is	one	of	the	most	widely	documented	issues	in	the	transportation	literature.	Jones	and	Lucas	describe	accessibility	as	providing	“measures	of	the	degree	to	which	people	can	reach	the	goods	and	services	that	society	considers	are	necessary	for	them	to	live	their	daily	lives,	but	with	an	emphasis	on	potential/capability	rather	than	actual	behavior”.	They	suggest	that	scholars	study	accessibility	issues	at	both	a	micro	level,	of	the	specific	accessibility	issues	of	infrastructure,	and	at	the	meso	level,	studying	accessibility	at	the	neighborhood	level,	evaluating	the	social	impacts	and	plight	of	communities	devoid	of	adequate	transportation	opportunities.		
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Accessibility	considerations	must	consider	the	wider	implications	for	communities	and	neighborhoods	to	reach	decent	education	and	employment	opportunities,	and	not	simply	the	distance	their	transportation	options	can	provide	them.	Transport	and	urban	planning	researchers	Tayebeh	Saghapour,	Sara	Moridpour,	and	Russell	Thompson	(2016)	define	transit-based	accessibility	as	the	“distance	between	a	destination	and	public	transport	stops	or	by	the	length	of	a	journey	from	an	origin	to	a	destination	via	public	transportation”.	Rock,	Ahern	and	Caulfield	contend	that	accessibility	should	be	defined	as	“the	extent	to	which	the	land	use	and	transport	systems	enable	(groups	of)	individuals	to	reach	activities	or	destinations	by	means	of	a	(combination	of)	transport	modes”.	Accessibility	is	therefore	a	measure	of	the	quality	of	transport	opportunity,	not	simply	the	quantity.		Contemporary	transportation	literature	also	makes	considerations	for	the	economic	considerations	that	transit	authorities	make	when	enacting	policy	and	infrastructure	decisions.	Turkish	Professor	of	Urban	Planning,	Eda	Beyzait	(2011),	contends	that	since	transport	projects	utilize	a	Cost-Benefit	Analysis	(CBA),	they	fail	to	consider	social	impacts	of	transit	projects	at	a	disaggregate	level	and	disregard	individual	diversities	and	the	actual	needs	of	a	society.	Rock,	Ahem	and	Caulfield	(2013)	agree	that	utilizing	a	CBA	is	limited	as	it	focuses	on	aggregate	welfare	and	they	instead	argue	for	a	Multi-Criteria	Analysis,	where	several	criteria	can	be	taken	into	account	simultaneously,	to	make	a	balanced	assessment	based	on	diverse	objectives	and	preferences	of	the	various	actors	in	the	decision-making	process.		Dutch	transport	scholars	Bert	van	Wee	and	Karst	(2011)	agree	that	CBAs	are	unsuitable	for	evaluating	social	exclusion	policies,	such	as	public	transit	inequity,	and	
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consider	the	role	that	transportation	would	optimally	play	in	providing	a	potential	‘equity	of	opportunity’,	where	disadvantaged	communities	have	adequate	access	to	education	and	employment	opportunities,	or	‘equity	of	outcome’,	which	implies	that	society	has	the	responsibility	to	ensure	that	disadvantaged	people	can	succeed	in	attaining	a	decent	level	of	education	and	employment.	They	distinguish	three	primary	theories	to	consider	in	transportation	equity	studies	today:	utilitarianism,	egalitarianism,	and	sufficientarianism.		These	three	theories	of	ethics	are	important	to	understand	when	making	considerations	over	whether	a	public	entity,	such	as	a	transportation	system,	meets	the	needs	of	the	people	its	designed	to	serve.	According	to	the	Stanford	Encyclopedia	of	Philosophy,	utilitarianism,	or	more	specifically	act	consequentialism,	is	the	claim	that	an	act	(or	in	this	case,	public	utility)	is	only	morally	good	if	the	total	amount	of	good	it	produces	is	greater	than	the	total	amount	of	bad	it	produces,	which	is	strongly	related	to	a	Cost	Benefit	Analysis,	weighing	pros	and	cons	against	each	other	to	determine	if	the	return	on	investment	is	net	positive	(Wee	and	Geurs	2011).	The	theory	of	utilitarianism	appears	to	be	commonplace	in	transit	agency	planning	policy,	and	it	could	be	argued	that	most	public	transit	projects	have	a	net	benefit	to	society,	even	if	those	benefits	are	not	distributed	equally	amongst	that	society’s	people.		Egalitarianism	theory,	on	the	other	hand,	holds	the	premise	that	all	people	should	be	treated	equally	(Sen	2004).	In	this	line	of	thought,	transit	agencies	should	strive	for	the	greatest	benefit	to	those	most	disadvantaged	in	society,	which	would	help	level	the	proverbial	playing	field	for	individuals	for	whom	private	modes	of	transportation	are	inaccessible.	Some	scholars	argue	that	in	the	case	of	transit	accessibility,	‘pure	equity’	would	be	impossible	given	the	intrinsic	nature	of	cities,	where	certain	realms	are	
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intrinsically	privileged	given	how	city	centers	are	developed	(K.	Martens,	Golub,	and	Robinson	2012).		Sufficientarianism,	like	Egalitarianism,	assumes	that	everyone	in	society	deserves	a	certain	level	of	comfort,	implying	a	threshold	of	‘what	is	sufficient’.	If	this	threshold	is	set	at	a	level	comparable	to	the	most	basic	option	of	transit	available	to	the	economically	privileged,	this	theory	would	assume	that	all	members	of	society	deserve	that	degree	of	accessibility	as	an	intrinsic	human	right.	Similar	to	Egalitarianism	theory,	Sufficientarianism	necessitates	that	those	with	the	lowest	welfare	be	provided	the	best	services,	to	help	alleviate	the	systematic	disadvantages	that	an	inequitable	system	of	distribution	provides	to	them.		As	an	alternative	to	previous	welfarist	approaches,	Amartya	Sen,	Professor	of	Economics	and	Philosophy	at	Harvard	University,	introduced	“the	notion	of	basic	capabilities”	which	he	described	as	“the	ability	to	move,	to	meet	one’s	nutritional	requirements,	the	wherewithal	to	be	clothed	and	sheltered,	the	power	to	participate	in	the	social	life	of	the	community”	(Sen	1980).	According	to	Hananel	and	Berechman	(2016),	Sen’s	capabilities	approach	(CA)	combines	concepts	of	freedom,	welfare	and	equity	into	one	framework.	They	argue	“the	capabilities	approach	focuses	on	the	question	of	what	a	person	can	achieve	if	provided	with	primary	goods	rather	than	on	the	question	of	how	many	goods	that	person	possesses”	(Hananel	and	Berechman	2016).	The	capabilities	approach	has	been	adapted	by	various	transit	scholars	to	study	transit-based	accessibility	in	the	context	of	social	justice	(Beyazit	2011)	(Wee	and	Geurs	2011),	and	has	been	expanded	upon	and	adapted	to	analyze	various	transit-related	issues.	In	particular,	the	Capabilities	Approach	has	been	used	as	a	tool	to	question	the	efficacy	of	
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using	a	Cost	Benefit	Analysis	in	measuring	the	social	exclusion	and	isolation	caused	by	transit	based	inequity.	Beyazit	(2011)	argues	that	the	CA	incites	a	debate	on	the	relationship	between	capability	of	mobility,	and	the	opportunities	that	a	transport	system	offers,	which	requires	active	engagement	from	a	variety	of	stakeholders.	Beyazit	contends	that	since	transport	has	the	important	function	of	enhancing	human	capabilities,	it	is	therefore	possible	to	measure	using	the	CA.			 Other	scholars	contend	that	the	CA	is	an	inappropriate	measure	to	evaluate	transit	equity.	Hananel	and	Berechman	argue	that	these	measures	focus	on	minimum	thresholds	of	access	that	communities	should	receive	to	be	considered	socially	and	morally	just,	and	therefore	group	communities	together	and	fail	to	account	for	individual	adversities	and	externalities.	“Decision-making	procedures	based	on	the	capabilities	approach	do	not	ask:	What	is	the	best	infrastructure	project	alternative	that	produces	the	highest	justice	results.	Instead,	it	specifies	the	desired	results	and	then	the	means	to	attain	them.	One	may	conclude	by	stating	that	application	of	the	capabilities	approach	to	“real”	transportation	projects	sounds	utopian.”		
	
Planning	the	Just	City		 Political	theorist	Susan	Fainstein	agrees	that	transportation	measures	derived	from	the	Capabilities	Approach	fail	to	consider	the	vast	social	diversity	that	exist	in	some	urban	areas.	In	her	2010	book	The	Just	City,	Fainstein	argues	that	those	initiatives	that	are	based	upon	the	Capabilities’	Approach	focus	on	thresholds	of	minimum	conditions	that	are	inappropriate	as	the	absolute	benchmark	for	these	diverse	neighborhoods.	Instead	of	
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arguing	for	a	threshold	of	basic	capabilities,	she	argues	for	the	maximization	of	three	values	Fainstein	believes	constitute	urban	justice:	equity,	democracy,	and	diversity.				 Gössling	(2016)	agrees	with	Fainstein,	arguing	that	‘just	cities’	can	“only	come	into	existence	where	residents	have	the	right	to	inhabit,	to	appropriate,	and	participate,	for	which	it	would	be	necessary	for	cities	to	embrace	concepts	of	equity,	democracy,	and	diversity,	and	to	overcome	neoliberalism	and	its	allocation	of	resources	at	the	expense	of	wider	social	benefits”.	Moreover,	Gössling	argues	that	there	is	a	considerable	paradox	between	the	stated	ambitions	of	transit	planning	agencies	to	create	more	sustainable	urban	transport	systems	and	the	persistent	reality	of	policy	geared	towards	the	car,	and	this	leads	to	an	‘implementation	gap’	in	transport	planning,	which	he	refers	to	as	‘inconsistencies’.	These	inconsistencies	in	transport	planning	and	implementation	Gössling	frames	as	injustices,	which	prevent	the	fulfillment	of	the	just	city.	Gössling	suggests	that	transport	systems	have	been	developed	on	the	basis	of	specific	industry	interests,	which	do	not	necessarily	represent	broader	societal	goals.	He	maintains	that	in	order	for	urban	transport	networks	to	be	equitable,	measures	to	incorporate	distributive	justice	must	be	considered.		In	her	2009	study,	Spatial	Justice	and	Planning,	Fainstein	too	argues	for	a	deliberative	democracy	approach,	one	where	planners	seek	to	listen	first,	especially	to	subordinated	groups.	“The	vision	of	the	just	city	calls	for	rectifying	injustices	in	a	world	where	control	of	investment	resources	by	a	small	stratum	constantly	re-creates	and	reinforces	subordination,	thus	resisting	attempts	at	reform,”	Fainstein	proclaimed.	Thus,	Fainstein	claims	that	participants	in	strong	democratic	deliberation	processes	must	consider	community	participation	to	be	absolutely	critical	towards	enacting	just	policy.	
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Urban	policy	consultants	Judith	Innes	and	David	Booher	(2000)	argue	that	in	order	for	deliberative	and	collaborative	planning	processes	to	flourish,	a	new	paradigm	for	public	participation	must	be	instituted.	“Public	participation	is	ostensibly	also	about	fairness	and	justice.	There	are	systematic	reasons	why	the	least	advantaged	groups’	needs	and	preferences	are	likely	to	be	unrecognized	through	the	normal	analytic	procedures	and	information	sources	of	bureaucrats,	legislative	officials	and	planners.	So	public	participation	gives	at	least	the	opportunity	for	people	to	be	heard	who	are	overlooked	or	misunderstood”	in	the	planning	process.	Thus,	Innes	and	Booher	maintain	that	for	these	collaborative	methods	to	become	commonplace,	a	set	of	principles	and	relatively	easy	to	follow	guidelines	must	be	developed	so	these	conversations	can	be	representative,	democratic	and	influential.	Since	communities	who	are	often	underrepresented	in	the	transportation	planning	process	are	also	often	historically	marginalized	in	other	aspects	of	life,	they	may	face	difficulty	attending	planning	meetings	and	engaging	in	the	process.	Innes	and	Booher	therefore	argue	that	these	collaborative	planning	processes	must	be	designed	to	assure	a	way	for	these	communities	to	engage	nonetheless.	Innes	and	Booher	contend	that	these	collaborative	planning	processes	can	lead	to	a	healthy	and	informed	civic	community.	“When	civic	community	is	alive	and	well,	it	means	that	citizens	talk	to	one	another	on	public	issues	and	build	an	understanding	of	these	issues	through	interchange	with	others.	As	a	result,	they	become	better	informed,	not	only	about	the	issues,	but	more	importantly	about	what	they	want	and	believe	in	themselves.	They	begin	also	to	develop	some	shared	sense	of	being	part	of	a	community	as	they	acquire	more	understanding	and	empathy	for	one	another	and	come	to	understand	the	problems	and	opportunities	they	share”	(Innes	and	Booher	2000).		
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Conclusion		 This	literature	review	considered	the	concept	of	transportation	justice,	a	growing	body	of	literature	concerned	with	the	disproportionate	impacts	of	transportation	policy	and	the	repercussions	these	policies	have	for	those	who	live	in	communities	underserved	by	public	transportation.	This	literature	is	particularly	concerned	with	the	legacies	of	discriminatory	transportation	decision-making	that	divides	urban	areas	on	those	who	have	adequate	access	to	transit,	and	those	who	are	deprived	of	essential	services	such	as	mass	transit.	Amongst	specific	importance	are	public	pressures,	such	as	the	tension	between	persuading	those	with	varied	transportation	options	to	choose	mass	transit	and	offering	adequate	services	to	those	most	dependent	on	public	transportation.	Scholars	also	identify	several	theories	that	evaluate	what	communities	need	in	regards	to	transportation	to	be	considered	adequate,	which	is	often	referred	to	as	a	threshold	approach	or	a	capabilities	approach.	Looking	forward,	transportation	scholars	suggest	that	collaborative	planning	processes	require	public	participation	in	order	to	be	democratic	and	just.		
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Chapter	Two:	MANANAGEMENT	OF	THE	NEW	YORK	CITY	SUBWAY	
	
	 Over	the	course	of	the	last	century	and	a	quarter,	the	New	York	City	subway	system	has	seen	a	tumultuous	history	of	management	from	several	entities.	Originally	developed	by	wealthy	mercantile	businessmen	in	a	public/private	partnership	at	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century,	the	subway	has	since	been	governed	by	the	New	York	City	Board	of	Transportation,	the	Transit	Authority,	and	most	recently	the	Metropolitan	Transportation	Authority	(MTA).	Evolving	from	a	privately	operated	corporation	to	a	municipal	agency,	the	management	of	the	New	York	City	subway	reveals	a	complex	narrative	of	social	and	economic	decision-making,	political	influences,	and	a	changing	legacy	of	societal	priorities.	By	documenting	this	changing	narrative,	this	chapter	will	demonstrate	how	the	inheritance	of	a	municipal	transportation	authority	from	a	for-profit	corporation	has	shaped	the	socioeconomic	polices	of	the	Metropolitan	Transportation	Authority	today.	Officially	designated	as	a	public	benefit	corporation,	I	ague	that	the	MTA’s	goals	are	to	maximize	profits	rather	than	serve	the	region’s	people	to	its	fullest	capability,	making	it	a	public	authority	that	views	its	riders	as	consumers	instead	of	citizens.		This	chapter	will	explore	the	management	philosophy	of	the	various	agencies;	private,	publicly	managed	by	the	city,	and	publicly	managed	by	a	state	agency,	to	assess	how	the	subway’s	fare	structuring	program	privileges	those	riders	who	have	the	financial	choice	to	another	mode	of	transportation.	Then,	considerations	will	be	made	for	how	disinvestment	caused	by	automobile	and	highway	construction	diverted	city	funds	essentially	needed	for	mass	transit.	This	period	of	disregard	for	public	transportation	maintenance	in	New	York	City	is	characterized	by	service	delays,	decreased	ridership,	and	a	frenzy	of	graffiti,	representing	a	communal	frustration	with	the	planning	choices	of	New	
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York	City	in	the	1960s	and	1970s.	The	chapter	will	end	by	analyzing	the	priorities	of	the	state	agency,	the	Metropolitan	Transportation	Authority,	a	body	that	has	steadily	increased	mass	transit	fares	to	a	level	now	cost-prohibitive	for	one	in	three	New	Yorkers	while	restructuring	debt	to	delay	the	burden	of	new	projects	to	future	generations.				
The	Early	Years:	1888-1953	
		 Towards	the	end	of	the	nineteenth	century,	New	York	City	was	experiencing	a	major	economic	and	population	boom,	and	businesses	needed	a	means	to	transport	workers	from	rural	towns	in	northern	Manhattan	to	industry	downtown.	On	January	31st,	1888,	Mayor	Abram	S.	Hewitt,	a	wealthy	iron	manufacturer,	proposed	the	construction	of	a	rapid	transit	railroad,	modeled	after	the	world’s	first	underground	railway	in	London.	As	a	stealthy	businessman,	Hewitt	was	able	to	balance	the	public	and	private	sectors	to	craft	a	proposal	that	served	the	interests	of	both	groups.	His	proposal	was	the	first	to	tie	government	ownership	with	private	construction	and	operation,	inspiring	the	Rapid	Transit	Act	of	1894.	The	Rapid	Transit	Act	gave	the	Chamber	of	Commerce	of	the	State	of	New	York	control	of	rapid	transit	planning,	while	also	allowing	government	investment	in	the	privately	operated	subway	corporations.	This	enabled	the	city	to	keep	fares	at	a	stable	and	accessible	price	of	five	cents	per	ride,	while	also	developing	a	transportation	network	that	could	alleviate	overcrowding	and	encourage	settlement	in	the	lightly	settled	outer	boroughs	(Derrick,	Passwell,	and	Petretta	2012).			 In	October	1904,	the	first	New	York	underground	subway	opened	for	operation.	The	Interborough	Rapid	Transit	Company	(IRT)	was	led	by	merchants	and	financed	by	August	Belmont	Junior,	a	wealthy	racehorse	owner/breeder.	Offering	an	efficient	and	affordable	
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way	to	get	from	lower	Manhattan	to	upper	Manhattan	and	the	Bronx,	the	IRT	was	a	great	success,	with	an	extension	to	Brooklyn	being	planned	within	its	first	year	of	operation.	Before	long,	however,	tensions	between	the	mercantile	IRT	owners	and	local	politicians	soared,	as	the	IRT	acquired	its	only	competitor,	the	Metropolitan	Street	Railway,	and	won	veto	power	over	new	construction.	In	his	article,	Politics	of	the	Third	Rail,	sociologist	Garrett	Ziegler	contends	that	the	subway	was	designed	to	serve	the	needs	of	oppressive	corporate	interests.	“From	the	outset	of	the	subway’s	construction,	the	dominant	systems	of	power	were	concerned	with	organizing	the	spatial	flows	of	an	abstracted	populace	in	order	to	maximize	industrial-corporate	productivity,”	he	wrote	(Ziegler	2004).		The	IRT’s	acquisition	of	the	Metropolitan	Street	Railway	and	subsequent	veto	power	drew	concern	over	a	group	of	progressive	reformers	who	sought	to	break	the	Interborough’s	subway	monopoly.	These	reformers	argued	that	the	construction	of	new	lines	would	disperse	immigrants	from	crowded	urban	slums	to	the	outskirts	of	the	city,	where	they	could	have	better	and	healthier	living	conditions	and	a	transit	system	that	would	allow	them	to	commute	into	the	central	business	district	(Hood	2004).	This	progressive	movement	called	upon	city	officials	to	provide	a	new	system	of	subway	operation.			 In	March	1913,	a	Dual	Contract	system	was	approved,	integrating	the	IRT	with	the	Brooklyn	Rapid	Transit	Company	(later	renamed	the	Brooklyn-Manhattan	Transit	Corporation,	or	BMT).	The	dual	system	more	than	doubled	the	total	transit	mileage	and	extended	the	subway	into	new	parts	of	the	Bronx,	Brooklyn,	and	Queens,	raising	the	number	of	passengers	using	rapid	transit	in	NYC	annually	from	810	million	in	1913	to	over	two	billion	riders	annually	by	1930	(Derrick	2001).	The	BMT	provided	a	competitor	to	the	
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IRT,	breaking	the	monopoly	that	plagued	the	early	years	of	the	subway	management.	From	the	development	of	the	dual	system	up	until	the	outbreak	of	WWII,	virtually	all	of	New	York	City’s	population	growth	took	place	in	the	“subway	suburbs”	opened	for	development	by	these	two	subway	corporations	(Derrick,	Passwell,	and	Petretta	2012).	Most	significantly,	the	Dual	Contract	agreement	mandated	a	five-cent	fare,	which	the	companies	were	reportedly	pleased	with,	because	they	felt	that	the	provision	would	end	any	pressure	to	lower	the	fare	(Sparberg	2015).	The	companies	themselves,	however,	succumbed	to	economic	crisis	a	decade	later	as	a	result	of	post	WWI	inflation.	Without	the	option	to	raise	the	nickel	fare,	the	IRT	and	BMT	began	to	run	with	a	deficit.	Their	demands	for	an	increased	fare	were	met	with	strong	resistance	from	a	vocal	public	who	were	haunted	by	the	memories	of	the	IRT’s	monopolization	of	transit	at	the	turn	of	the	century.			 The	failure	of	the	dual	system	to	cope	with	WWI	related	inflation	while	being	restricted	to	the	nickel	fare	opened	a	void	to	be	filled	by	a	publicly	owned	transit	operator.	John	F.	Hylan,	an	urban	populist	who	passionately	opposed	the	private	subway	operators,	was	elected	Mayor	in	1918.	Responding	to	a	riding	public	who	considered	the	nickel	fare	an	entitlement	that	they	simply	would	not	give	up,	Hylan	made	the	maintenance	of	the	nickel	fare	a	lynchpin	of	his	administration	(Sparberg	2015).	According	to	historian	Clifton	Hood,	“Hylan	acted	within	the	context	of	a	political	culture	where	public	ownership	and	regulation	combined	with	private	operation	to	encourage	competition	and	discord	rather	than	cooperation,	where	strong	popular	pressures	for	a	low	fare	and	for	high-quality	passenger	service	intensified	the	friction	between	government	and	business,	and	where	ideological	resistance	to	public	investment	in	rapid	transit	perpetuated	the	system’s	fiscal	problems”	(Hood	2004).		
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In	1925,	Mayor	Hylan	won	approval	by	the	State	of	New	York	to	build	an	independent	subway	system,	the	IND,	created	by	state	law	and	managed	and	operated	by	the	city	government.	From	1932	to	1940,	the	IND	built	subway	lines	throughout	the	city,	providing	faster	and	more	convenient	service	and	encouraging	development	in	previously	neglected	areas,	such	as	Queens	Boulevard	in	Queens	(Derrick,	Passwell,	and	Petretta	2012).	With	this	new	municipally	operated	agency	providing	superior	service,	the	IRT	and	BMT	companies	saw	stark	reductions	in	ridership	and	their	financial	conditions	worsened.	Additionally,	as	the	Great	Depression	ravaged	privately	owned	business	operations,	an	opportunity	presented	itself	for	the	subways	to	be	unified	as	a	single	system.	In	June	1940,	Mayor	Fiorello	H.	LaGuardia	acquired	the	Interborough	and	Brooklyn-Manhattan	subway	systems,	merging	them	with	the	independent	subway	system	to	form	a	single	subway	network	operated	by	the	New	York	City	Board	of	Transportation.	This	unification	did	not	solve	the	transit’s	fiscal	problems,	and	the	financial	emergency	resulting	from	the	Great	Depression	and	WWII	forced	the	subway	to	operate	on	deficits,	undermining	the	city’s	ability	to	continue	to	offer	a	stabilized	nickel	fare.	This	operating	deficit	mounted	pressure	for	the	new	publicly	managed	unified	subway	system	to	raise	the	fare,	which	was	met	with	substantial	resistance.			 Perhaps	the	strongest	supporter	of	maintaining	the	nickel	fare	was	Stanley	M.	Isaacs,	a	liberal	Republican	who	served	as	Manhattan	borough	president	from	1938	through	1941	and	then	as	a	city	council	member	until	his	death	in	1962.	Isaacs	rejected	the	business	industry’s	logic	that	the	subway	ought	to	be	a	self-supporting	business	that	offered	a	product	that	deserved	a	higher	cost,	and	instead	contended	that	rapid	transit	was	a	vital	municipal	service	that	gave	the	city	“a	great	unifying	force”	and	served	as	the	
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“highway	of	the	masses”	(Hood	2004).	Arguing	that	the	city	did	not	charge	user	fees	for	schools,	sanitation	pickups,	fire	protection,	water	supply,	or	street	repairs,	that	the	same	philosophy	should	be	applied	to	the	city’s	transit	system.	He	suggested	that	the	operating	costs	of	the	subway	should	be	supported	by	property	tax,	asserting	that	“the	capital	charges	of	those	subways	which	had	built	up	real	estate	values	should	be	carried	by	real	estate”	(Hood	2004).			 Isaacs’	defense	of	the	public	right	to	transit	is	particularly	remarkable	in	today’s	political	climate.	Operating	out	of	a	friendlier	political	climate	where	politicians’	values	tended	to	cross	the	aisle	much	more	frequently,	Stanley	Isaacs	represented	a	political	will	that	stood	for	all	people	–	not	just	the	rich	and	powerful.	Isaacs’	greatest	fear	was	the	mounting	competition	of	the	private	automobile,	which	was	praised	by	his	business	adversaries	as	the	future	of	transportation.	When	in	1945,	master	builder	Robert	Moses	unveiled	an	$82	million	plan	for	more	than	two	hundred	miles	of	highways	and	bridges	that	would	be	funded	by	a	city	budget	freed	of	subway	expenses,	Isaacs	objected.		 “I	believe	that	this	is	probably	the	most	audacious	proposal	yet	made	to	saddle	those	least	able	to	afford	it	with	the	cost	of	civic	improvements	which	in	the	main	serve	those	in	the	higher	income	brackets;	to	make	those	who	do	not	own	cars	but	travel	in	the	subway	indirectly	subsidize	the	motorist.	The	whole	program	is	clear.	The	straphanger	is	to	pay	double	the	present	fare	so	as	to	carry	the	full	interest	upon	and	amortization	of	the	capital	cost	of	the	subways.	Why?	So	the	city	will	be	able	to	borrow	more	money	to	build	parkways,	expressways,	and	highways,	which	are	to	be	furnished	free	of	charge	for	the	capital	improvements	to	the	man	who	can	afford	his	own	car,	doesn’t	travel	on	the	
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subways,	and	doesn’t	pay	even	a	nickel	toward	the	construction	of	the	speedways	furnished	him,”	(Hood	2004).			 The	decades	following	World	War	Two	were	characterized	by	an	exodus	of	middle	and	upper	middle	class	New	Yorkers	to	the	suburbs,	facilitated	by	the	rise	of	the	automobile	and	housing	policies	that	encouraged	suburbanization.	The	subway	as	a	result	experienced	a	significant	decrease	in	ridership.	Though	in	1947	the	unified	subway	system	experienced	a	then	record	high	in	ridership,	about	two	billion	per	year,	ridership	dwindled	over	the	proceeding	decades,	reaching	a	record	low	of	less	than	a	billion	annual	riders	in	1977.	Various	factors	contributed	to	this.	The	New	York	City	Metropolitan	area	developed	rapidly	following	World	War	Two,	fostered	by	high	automobile	usage	and	federal	highway	projects	that	weakened	the	region’s	financial	and	population	base.	Massive	amounts	of	government	funds	were	consumed	by	Robert	Moses’	elaborate	network	of	highways,	parkways,	bridges	and	tunnels.	Federal	mortgage	policy	encouraged	construction	of	ample	new	housing,	particularly	in	the	rapidly	expanding	New	York	suburbs,	diverting	the	subway	systems’	rider	base.	Meanwhile,	new	construction	and	expansion	of	the	system	was	essentially	frozen	during	the	war,	and	capital	investment	in	subsequent	decades	was	insufficient	to	both	meet	the	needs	of	infrastructure	maintenance	and	allow	for	continued	expansion	of	the	system.	This	inability	to	expand	the	system	following	World	War	Two	made	the	subway	inadequate	to	meet	the	needs	of	changing	demographics	and	employment	patterns	(Derrick	2001).	The	subway	fare	increased	to	a	dime	on	July	1,	1948,	and	would	soon	again	be	raised	to	15	cents	upon	the	creation	of	the	Transit	Authority	in	1953.	With	financial	pressures	mounting,	the	Board	of	Transportation	was	considered	a	never-ending	political	football	that	needed	reform,	prompting	the	creation	of	a	new	
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management	solution	that	would	remove	the	entire	transit	system	from	direct	mayoral	control	(Sparberg	2015).	In	March	1953,	New	York	State	abolished	the	Board	of	Transportation	and	announced	the	creation	of	a	new	public	agency,	the	New	York	City	Transit	Authority	(NYCTA),	independent	of	the	mayor	and	mandated	by	law	to	set	the	mass	transit	fares	at	a	level	appropriately	able	to	cover	all	operating	costs,	allowing	the	NYC	budget	to	no	longer	focus	on	subsidizing	mass	transportation.	According	to	historian	Clifton	Hood,	“The	Transit	Authority	contributed	to	the	subways’	subsequent	physical	deterioration	by	enshrining	the	ideology	of	business	management,	insulating	transit	management	from	the	public,	and	lessening	the	accountability	of	top	elected	officials	for	transit	decisions,”	(Hood	2004).		
	
The	Transit	Authority:	1953-1968	
	The	creation	of	the	New	York	City	Transit	Authority	ushered	a	new	era	with	a	reformed	mindset.	No	longer	concerned	with	providing	transit	services	to	the	masses	at	an	attainable	cost,	the	subway	was	now	managed	by	a	body	concerned	with	the	bottom	line.	Mandated	to	charge	a	fare	sufficient	to	cover	all	operating	costs,	the	NYCTA	increased	the	fare	to	fifteen	cents	on	July	25,	which	required	the	creation	of	a	subway	token.	The	token,	which	was	used	from	1953	to	the	adoption	of	electronic	collection	machines	in	2003,	became	synonymous	with	the	system’s	new	ideology.	The	cost	of	municipal	transportation	in	New	York	City	was	for	the	first	time	separate	from	the	city’s	fiscal	responsibility,	and	costs	would	continue	to	mount	as	inflation	and	financial	problems	dictated.	To	make	matters	worse,	the	system	was	left	in	disrepair	following	World	War	Two,	posing	serious	economic	burdens	to	the	city’s	rider	base.		
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According	to	a	1954	Transit	Authority	annual	report,	the	system	was	left	in	complete	disarray	following	years	of	mismanagement	and	disinvestment	during	the	Second	World	War.	The	annual	report	refers	to	an	“enormous	backlog	of	urgent	major	repairs	which	have	been	deferred	far	beyond	the	time	recognized	for	proper	maintenance	standards”	(New	York	City	Transit	Authority,	1954).	In	order	to	remedy	the	condition	of	the	subway	fleet,	the	TA	spent	$993.8	million	between	fiscal	years	1954	and	1967,	or	$70.9	million	annually,	to	rehabilitate	rail	equipment	that	had	heavily	deteriorated.	These	costs	were	bore	by	the	Authority’s	capital	budget,	which	is	separate	from	its	operating	budget	produced	by	fare	collection.		
	
	
Figure	One:	Cohen,	James	K.	1988.	“Capital	Investment	and	the	Decline	of	Mass	Transit	in	New	York	City,	1945-1981.”		 	
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The	Transit	Authority	was	tremendously	successful	at	improving	rolling	stock	conditions,	even	though	its	rider	base	was	depleting.	As	shown	in	Table	1,	nearly	half	of	the	city’s	subway	fleet	was	thirty	years	or	older	in	1953,	leading	to	regular	breakdowns	and	a	constant	need	to	remove	cars	from	the	track	for	repair.	By	1967,	the	TA	was	able	to	greatly	reduce	the	overall	age	of	its	subway	fleet,	with	nearly	half	of	all	subway	cars	under	ten	years	of	age.	With	a	younger	fleet	and	fewer	breakdowns,	the	city	saw	a	solid	increase	in	ridership,	improving	from	1.31	million	passengers	in	1958	to	1.38	million	in	1964	(Cohen	1988).	Such	a	drastic	improvement	in	service	can	be	attributed	to	the	substantial	capital	investment	of	the	Transit	Authority,	just	short	of	$1	billion	over	this	fourteen-year	period.		By	the	mid	1960s,	the	NYCTA	had	reversed	the	downward	spiral	in	transit	ridership,	largely	due	to	an	improved	public	perception	of	the	fifteen-cent	fare,	which	was	considered	a	good	value	while	other	consumer	goods	and	services	had	risen	in	cost	(Sparberg	2015).	Although	the	fare	increased	to	twenty	cents	in	July	1966,	the	hike	was	only	the	second	during	the	tenure	of	the	Transit	Authority,	and	kept	the	cost	competitive	with	other	cities’	mass	transit	systems,	which	was	still	attainable	for	most	New	Yorkers.	By	1968,	external	pressures	both	political	and	economic	pushed	the	NYCTA	into	the	creation	of	a	larger	authority	managed	by	New	York	State,	the	Metropolitan	Transportation	Authority	(MTA)		The	inception	of	the	MTA	was	the	product	of	a	long	battle	between	Mayor	John	Lindsay	and	Governor	Nelson	Rockefeller.	Though	perceived	by	the	public	as	like-minded	liberal	Republicans,	Lindsay	and	Rockefeller	privately	disliked	each	other	and	viewed	each	other	as	rivals,	with	mutual	higher	political	ambitions	that	they	viewed	as	putting	each	other	at	odds	(Sparberg	2015).	Frustrated	with	the	mounting	transit	costs	on	riders,	Lindsay	proposed	a	1965	plan	to	use	surplus	toll	revenues	from	the	Triborough	Bridge	and	
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Tunnel	Authority	(TBTA)	to	offset	the	NYCTA’s	deficits.	Robert	Moses,	Chairman	of	the	TBTA,	called	the	proposal	“illegal”,	and	his	supporters	rallied	to	defeat	Lindsey’s	lobbying	trip	to	Albany.	After	acquiring	the	Long	Island	Railroad	from	Pennsylvania	Railroad	in	1965,	Governor	Rockefeller	created	a	Metropolitan	Commuter	Transportation	Authority	(MCTA)	and	set	his	eyes	on	the	city’s	mass	transit	system.				
Metropolitan	Transportation	Authority:	1968-Present	
		 In	1968,	New	York	State	Governor	Nelson	Rockefeller	expanded	the	Metropolitan	Commuter	Transportation	Authority	(MCTA)	to	include	the	Transit	Authority	(TA),	the	Triborough	Bridge	and	Tunnel	Authority	(TBTA),	and	all	other	public	transit	operations	in	the	city,	to	form	the	Metropolitan	Transportation	Authority	(MTA).	Upon	the	formation	of	the	MTA,	Governor	Rockefeller	campaigned	for	a	$2.5	billion	transportation	bond,	which	became	the	main	issue	in	the	November	1967	election.	Of	the	$2.5	billion,	$1.25	billion	was	dedicated	to	the	state’s	mass	transit	system,	with	the	largest	portion	going	to	New	York	City	and	the	seven	counties	surrounding	it	(Sparberg	2015).	The	1967	transportation	bill	represented	a	priority	that	the	city	and	state	would	support	maintenance	and	expansion	of	New	York’s	transportation	infrastructure,	but	the	specific	priorities	of	this	support	were	far	more	nuanced.		Rockefeller	appointed	his	close	friend	and	advisor	William	Ronan	as	MTA	Chairman,	and	issued	a	“grand	design”	for	upgrading	the	New	York	Metropolitan	area’s	transportation	network,	a	plan	similar	to	the	extravagant	highway	schemes	put	forth	by	Robert	Moses.	The	grand	design	focused	on	building	new	subways	within	New	York	City,	upgrading	the	commuter	rail	services,	raising	platform	levels,	and	providing	direct	access	to	midtown	for	
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the	Long	Island	Railroad.	With	the	exception	of	the	purchasing	of	new	rolling	stock,	the	grand	design	had	little	consideration	for	rehabilitating	the	existing	transit	infrastructure	(Derrick,	Passwell,	and	Petretta	2012).	Funding	for	this	project	was	comprised	the	1967	bond	issue	approved	by	NY	State	voters,	as	well	as	an	expected	increase	of	transportation	aid	from	the	federal	government.	Though	it	seemed	like	this	project	would	succeed	at	first,	the	ambitious	early	plans	of	the	MTA	came	to	an	abrupt	halt,	with	New	York	City,	and	the	state	as	a	whole,	experiencing	a	major	economic	downturn	in	the	early	1970s,	causing	voters	to	reject	bond	issues	in	1971	and	1973.	In	1974	Nelson	Rockefeller	was	appointed	Gerald	Ford’s	vice	president,	and	William	Ronan	resigned	as	MTA	chairman.		Under	MTA	oversight,	service	declined	steadily.	Though	the	MTA	invested	more	than	the	TA	did	in	capital	investment	for	infrastructure	maintenance,	rolling	stock	experienced	significant	delays	and	system	failure	–	increasingly	worse	as	the	1970s	progressed.	The	average	distance	a	subway	car	would	travel	between	failure	between	1968-1980	of	17,780	miles	was	a	43%	drop	from	pre-1968	levels	of	31,319	miles.	
	
Figure	Two:	Cohen,	James	K.	1988.	“Capital	Investment	and	the	Decline	of	Mass	Transit	in	New	York	City,	1945-1981.”	
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This	deterioration	is	strange,	however,	when	considering	the	increased	system	investment	in	the	years	following	the	creation	of	the	MTA.	Although	the	fiscal	crisis	of	the	1970s	decreased	city	funding	to	the	agency,	state	and	federal	funding	for	mass	transit	increased	steadily	during	the	1970s.	This	was	due	in	part	to	the	passage	of	the	Urban	Mass	Transportation	Act	of	1970,	which	authorized	$12	billion	to	mass	transit	projects	nationwide.	The	total	capital	resources	available	were	actually	higher	in	the	years	following	the	creation	of	the	MTA,	yet	this	period	saw	a	progressive	decline	in	service	and	a	heightened	demand	for	maintenance	to	the	rolling	stock.		From	1953-1967	(the	years	the	subway	was	operated	by	the	Transit	Authority),	the	TA	spent	44.1%	on	infrastructure	maintenance	and	only	17.5%	on	new	route	construction.	When	the	MTA	assumed	control	in	1968,	priorities	were	reversed	and	41%	of	funds	were	dedicated	to	the	“grand	design”	of	system	expansion,	with	only	22.9%	of	funds	invested	in	modernizing	the	existing	infrastructure	(Cohen	1988).	These	percentages	are	particularly	significant	when	considering	that	the	difference	in	available	funding	was	only	increased	by	13%.	This	priority	shift	to	system	expansion	drew	substantial	funds	that	were	previously	used	for	infrastructure	maintenance,	leading	to	dilapidated	conditions	and	regular	delays.		With	a	greatly	diminished	rider	base	and	a	lack	of	institutional	support	to	maintain	the	rolling	stock	to	their	condition	in	the	1960s,	the	subways	became	a	canvas	for	graffiti	artists	to	express	themselves.	Representing	a	loss	of	control	for	government	officials,	subway	graffiti	epitomized	the	frustration	that	New	Yorkers	had	about	political	ineptitude	in	the	1970s	and	into	the	1980s.	As	historian	Garrett	Ziegler	describes,	“Graffiti	is	the	very	definition	of	a	tactical	appropriation	of	ordered	space	–	it	gives	legibility	to	the	individual	rendered	invisible	by	the	totalizing	perspective	of	the	planned	subway.	Graffiti	is	such	a	
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disruption	of	rational	space,	in	fact,	that	it	seems	to	highlight	the	residual	fears	in	the	breast	of	the	urban	subject,	thus	further	undercutting	the	productive	designs	of	the	planned	city”	(Ziegler	2004).	Fed	up	with	government	bureaucracy	and	the	economic	decline	of	New	York	in	the	1970s,	people	began	to	speak	out	against	a	public	transportation	system	that	seized	to	meet	the	need	of	its	citizens.	Ziegler	refers	to	graffiti	as	“the	most	overt	manifestation	of	a	long	line	of	interconnected	and	developing	tactics	of	resistance	to	the	functionalist	city.”		Before	long,	the	MTA	and	the	New	York	City	police	force	began	to	crack	down	on	graffiti	artists,	and	along	with	its	increased	acceptance	in	mainstream	artist	culture,	subway	graffiti	lost	its	popularity	and	the	public	started	to	view	it	with	disdain.	In	1982,	Mario	Cuomo	was	elected	Governor	and	appointed	David	Gunn	to	run	the	TA,	with	a	massive	cleanup	effort	as	his	focus.	Embarking	on	a	campaign	to	crack	down	on	subway	graffiti	artwork,	Gunn	made	clear	that	the	MTA	would	be	reclaiming	control	of	the	system.	By	1989,	Gunn	had	completed	his	clearing	of	graffiti	from	the	New	York	City	subway	cars,	and	was	dubbed	‘The	Man	Who	Saved	the	Subway”,	admired	by	transportation	bureaucrats	around	the	globe	(Ziegler	2004).		The	acclaim	that	Gunn	received	from	fellow	transit	officials	illuminates	the	ultimate	goals	of	agencies	like	the	MTA:	to	maintain	supreme	authority	over	urban	areas,	and	ensure	order.	This	might	be	acceptable,	if	their	aims	were	to	provide	equitable	transit	to	all	members	of	the	city,	yet	I	argue	that	this	priority	pales	in	comparison	to	economic	gain.	The	1990s	saw	a	radical	economic	transformation,	one	that	helped	form	the	inequities	that	plague	the	NYC	transit	system	today.	George	Pataki	was	elected	Governor	in	1994,	and	he	championed	a	campaign	to	convert	state	and	local	funding	for	capital	projects	to	a	system	
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of	borrowing	through	the	sale	of	bonds	backed	by	various	revenue	streams	(Derrick,	Passwell,	and	Petretta	2012).	Though	this	evaded	the	need	to	increase	taxes	to	cover	capital	renewal	costs,	it	placed	the	burden	of	these	expenses	onto	future	taxpayers	and	transit	riders,	leading	to	increased	and	rising	fare	prices	today.	This	mentality	of	putting	off	the	expense	of	infrastructure	maintenance	may	have	seemed	like	a	decent	idea	at	the	time,	but	it	has	led	to	fare	structuring	today	that	puts	public	transportation	in	New	York	City	at	a	price	that’s	inaccessible	for	millions	of	New	Yorkers	who	need	it	most.	This	system	of	accruing	significant	debt	in	order	to	finance	infrastructure	improvement	projects	has	become	commonplace	for	the	Metropolitan	Transportation	Authority.		In	2002,	the	MTA,	advised	by	interested	financiers	and	Wall	Street	investment	bankers,	adopted	a	debt-refinancing	strategy	that	extended	the	repayment	period	for	$13	billion	debt	they	incurred	from	a	$20	billion	capital	improvement	program	for	the	years	2000-2004.	Policy	analysts	Jonathan	Justice	and	Gerald	Miller	argue	that	this	refinancing	program	violated	a	fundamental	professional	norm	of	cost	minimization,	by	incurring	more	than	$4	billion	in	additional	interest	payment	fees	on	that	original	$13	billion	debt	(Justice	and	Miller	2011).	By	deferring	this	debt	to	future	taxpayers	and	estimated	increased	fare	prices	in	the	coming	decades,	the	MTA	is	placing	the	burden	of	these	costs	onto	future	generations,	compromising	intergenerational	equity	and	the	ability	for	the	agency	to	continue	modernizing	the	subway	system	in	the	future.	This	represents	the	agency’s	priority	to	serve	the	needs	of	the	present,	while	possibly	neglecting	the	ramifications	for	the	future.	Given	the	apparent	lack	of	citizen	input	in	this	decision	making	process,	it	is	important	to	recognize	the	structural	entities	that	do	exist	to	keep	the	MTA	in	check	and	advocate	for	improved	transportation	options	for	all	New	Yorkers.		
	 42	
Conclusion	The	history	of	management	of	the	New	York	City	subway	system	illuminates	the	problematic	nature	of	a	transit	authority	that	was	originally	created	as	for-profit	corporations.	The	relationship	between	public	investment	and	private	for-profit	management	at	the	subway’s	inception	has	never	fully	shed	its	complexities.	Although	the	subway	management	has	had	input	from	government	officials	since	WWII,	its	economic	policies	do	not	provide	modal	opportunity	to	all	citizens	of	New	York	City.	As	urban	sociologist	John	Pucher	argues,	“public	transit	agencies	have	perpetuated	historic	discriminatory	patterns	of	service	and	fare	structure	inherited	from	private	transit	operators	and	have,	in	addition,	introduced	new	and	perhaps	more	serious	forms	of	inequity”	(Pucher	1982).	Indeed,	as	fares	for	the	subway	and	bus	continue	to	rise,	the	affordability	of	New	York	City	public	transportation	has	created	a	scenario	where	thousands	of	New	Yorkers	must	choose	between	taking	the	subway	or	bus,	and	putting	food	on	the	table.	That	is	not	a	choice	that	anyone	should	have	to	make.		The	disinvestment	in	mass	transit	following	World	War	Two	had	ramifications	throughout	the	United	States	on	urban	subway	and	bus	systems,	but	particularly	in	New	York	City	where	so	many	residents	rely	on	mass	transit	to	get	to	work.	The	lack	of	attention	to	the	disproportionate	impacts	of	fare	increases	and	structuring	begs	several	questions	about	how	the	MTA	operates.	How	can	transit	agencies	restructure	their	political	and	financial	structure	to	include	voices	that	are	historically	silenced	from	their	decision-making	process?	Should	the	most	transit-disadvantaged	members	of	society	be	given	the	best	public	transit	service,	given	that	they	depend	on	it	the	most	to	work	for	the	possibility	of	upward	mobility?	The	following	chapters	will	explore	the	diversion	of	resources	
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following	postwar	suburbanization,	recent	developments	such	as	gentrification	that	have	further	isolated	New	York’s	most	disadvantaged	residents,	and	finally	examples	of	community	organizations	that	are	advocating	for	transit	equity	in	various	forms	including	affordability,	access,	and	representation.		
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Chapter	Three:	POSTWAR	TRANSIT	INEQUITY	IN	NEW	YORK	CITY	
		 Similar	to	other	large	cities	in	the	United	States	following	the	end	of	World	War	Two,	New	York	City	experienced	several	monumental	changes	that	have	vastly	altered	land	use,	demographics,	employment	patterns	and	public	transportation.	A	rise	in	automobile	production	and	usage	led	to	the	development	of	freeway	projects	nationwide,	making	highway-based	transportation	the	foundation	for	rapid	suburban	development.	The	exodus	of	middle	and	upper-middle	class	white	Americans	to	newly	created	suburban	towns	stripped	cities	of	large	amounts	of	their	tax	base,	immobilizing	the	functional	vigor	of	social	services	including	schools,	healthcare	facilities,	and	public	transportation.	Many	industries	fled	the	city	too,	pulling	thousands	of	decent	manufacturing	jobs	out	of	the	urban	core	and	devastating	the	urban	economy.		The	tremendous	success	of	the	automobile,	coupled	with	the	strength	of	auto	and	oil	lobbies,	effectively	relegated	mass	transit	to	a	realm	of	secondary	importance,	signaling	an	era	of	divestment	and	neglect	that	lasted	for	decades.	Discriminatory	housing	and	bank	lending	policies	prevented	immigrant	and	minority	communities	from	sharing	in	this	rapid	suburbanization,	significantly	altering	the	demographics	of	Manhattan	and	its	outer	boroughs.	This	chapter	will	explore	the	historical	postwar	developments	that	have	divided	the	New	York	City	Metropolitan	Area	over	those	who	have	access	to	the	transportation	network,	and	those	who	have	been	deprived	of	this	essential	opportunity.	I	will	begin	by	analyzing	how	the	automobile,	highway	development,	and	suburbanization	in	the	decade	following	WWII	diverted	funding	for	NYC	mass	transit.	Of	exceptional	importance	in	this	time	period	is	the	manipulative	zeal	of	Robert	Moses,	who	was	possibly	the	most	impactful	figure	in	the	creation	of	New	York	City’s	public	infrastructure	and	whose	policies	towards	
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“urban	renewal”	and	“slum	clearance”	had	a	devastating	effect	on	immigrants	and	people	of	color.	I	will	then	assess	how	the	conception	of	the	Metropolitan	Transportation	Authority,	a	state	agency	created	in	1968,	completely	changed	the	funding	priorities	and	investment	structure	of	mass	transit	in	New	York	City	and	established	political	tension	between	the	city	and	state	governments	over	who	is	responsible	for	maintaining	and	developing	new	public	transportation	projects.			
The	Flight	to	Suburbia		 In	the	years	following	World	War	Two,	the	New	York	Metropolitan	Area	experienced	an	exodus	of	middle	and	upper-middle	class	white	residents	to	newly	developing	suburbs	of	Nassau	and	Suffolk	counties	in	Long	Island	and	to	Westchester	and	Rockland	counties	to	the	north.	This	process	of	rapid	suburbanization	eroded	the	city’s	tax	base,	reducing	revenues	available	for	social	welfare	expenditures	and	making	jobs	and	educational	opportunities	inaccessible	to	those	left	in	the	urban	core.	Additionally,	the	massive	postwar	flight	to	the	suburbs	was	overwhelmingly	white:	New	York	City	experienced	a	net	migration	of	464,000	whites	during	the	1940s,	828,293	whites	during	the	1950s,	and	519,338	white	residents	during	the	1960s	(Wallock	1991).	According	to	sociologist	Nathan	Kantrowitz,	African-Americans	made	up	13.6	percent	of	New	York	City’s	residents	in	1960,	but	only	4.8	percent	of	the	residents	of	Nassau,	Suffolk,	Westchester,	and	Rockland	counties	(Kantrowitz	1969).	Puerto	Ricans	amounted	to	7.8	percent	of	the	city’s	population,	but	constituted	only	0.5	percent	of	the	suburban	population.	Kantrowitz	describes	the	rapid	white	flight	to	the	city’s	newly	developing	suburbs	as	both	divisive	on	race	and	class	lines,	as	leaving	Manhattan	was	a	sign	of	social	mobility:	moving	outward	
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meant	moving	upward.	New	York’s	socioeconomic	transformation	following	this	postwar	suburbanization	is	somewhat	unique	in	the	context	of	other	urban	postwar	redevelopment	processes	in	the	United	States.	Unlike	many	American	cities	in	the	postwar	years,	where	a	declining	central	city	was	surrounded	by	a	prosperous	suburban	ring	(known	as	the	“doughnut	complex”),	New	York	developed	differently.	In	New	York,	the	core	of	the	city	was	“revitalized”,	the	surrounding	portions	of	the	city	(most	parts	of	the	outer	boroughs)	became	“blighted”,	and	the	entirety	of	the	city	was	encircled	by	the	“prosperous	suburbs”	(Wallock	1991).		This	process	of	suburbanization	and	revitalization	of	the	urban	core	pushed	people	of	color	and	low-income	people	to	the	outer	ring	of	the	city,	communities	in	Brooklyn,	Queens	and	the	Bronx,	which	are	less	served	by	social	services	such	as	public	transportation.	By	the	mid-1970s,	as	a	nationwide	economic	recession	was	ravaging	the	majority	of	America’s	cities,	New	York’s	working	poor	was	hit	particularly	hard.	This	led	to	shrinking	opportunities	and	declining	social	conditions,	exacerbated	by	inflation	trends	and	recessionary	cycles	of	the	economy,	a	soaring	deficit	of	the	federal	government,	deep	cuts	in	social	welfare	at	the	federal	and	state	levels,	and	a	steep	decline	in	low-income	housing	(Katz	1996).	While	the	economic	recession	of	the	1970s	affected	all	New	Yorkers,	the	decline	in	social	services	impacted	marginalized	communities	in	a	disproportionately	burdensome	way.	As	federal	and	state	subsidies	encouraged	growth	in	the	suburbs	and	this	precipitous	white	flight	divided	resources	into	the	“prosperous	suburbs”	and	the	“blighted”	outer	boroughs,	those	living	in	underserved	communities	had	declining	governmental	support.		
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White	flight	deteriorates	the	conditions	of	the	urban	core	in	several	facets.	In	addition	to	damaging	the	reputation	of	the	neighborhoods	being	vacated,	white	flight	also	leads	to	the	abandonment	of	manufacturing	and	other	industries,	reducing	several	sources	of	revenue	for	the	municipal	tax	base	and	diminishing	social	services.	In	New	York	City,	suburbanization	and	white	flight	led	to	an	exacerbation	of	existing	social	problems,	on	a	larger	scale.	According	to	a	1961	study	by	Rosalind	Tough	and	Gordon	D.	Mac	Donald,	“areas	that	were	middle-income	housing	less	than	ten	years	ago,	are	below	standard	today	largely	because	of	overcrowding	and	lack	of	maintenance;	schools	in	these	areas	which	were	previously	meeting	the	educational	needs	of	children	from	middle-income	homes,	today	are	servicing	the	children	from	the	disadvantaged	groups	and	in	many	instances	achieving	a	level	of	education	below	that	for	New	York	City	as	a	whole”	(Tough	and	Donald	1961).		
The	Impact	of	Urban	Renewal	on	New	York	City:		
The	Legacy	of	Robert	Moses	
	It	could	be	argued	that	no	one	individual	impacted	the	development	of	modern	New	York	City	than	Robert	Moses.	Referred	to	by	many	as	the	“Master	Builder”,	Moses	deceptively	manipulated	the	many	titles	he	held	to	develop	New	York	in	his	vision.	Though	he	was	never	elected	to	any	of	his	positions	in	public	office,	Moses	was	able	to	usurp	the	respect	of	mayors,	governors,	and	presidents	to	progress	his	agenda	of	constructing	the	modern	American	city.	Social	organizer	Omar	Freilla	describes	Moses’s	process,	“elected	by	no	one,	Moses	held	everyone	from	mayors	and	governors	to	presidents	in	check.	His	power	came	from	the	skillful	manipulation	of	the	spoils	from	the	many	titles	that	he	often	held	simultaneously.	The	lack	of	accountability	to	the	public	allowed	by	these	various	organizations	provided	him	with	plenty	of	room	to	move	about	in	secret.	[Moses]	is	
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credited	with	having	shaped	the	face	of	the	modern	American	city	more	than	any	other	person”	(Freilla	2004).	Following	the	development	of	Moses’s	strategy	of	urban	renewal,	this	chapter	will	assess	how	Moses’s	policies	divided	New	York	City	along	racial	and	socioeconomic	lines,	and	how	this	division	has	led	to	inequalities	in	the	subway	system	today.		
	 In	the	1950s,	the	Committee	on	Slum	Clearance	of	the	City	of	New	York,	led	by	Robert	Moses,	published	twenty-six	site-specific	slum	clearance	brochures,	attempting	to	demonstrate	the	blighted	conditions	that	persisted	in	these	areas.	In	an	effort	to	convince	politicians	and	urban	planners	that	these	sites	in	need	of	redevelopment,	Moses	and	his	Committee	relied	on	the	portrayal	of	five	photographs	for	each	site,	providing	only	a	small	amount	of	text	in	a	caption,	to	convey	these	communities	as	slums.	This	redevelopment	was	made	possible	by	Title	I	of	the	US	Housing	Act	of	1949,	which	provided	subsidies	for	the	clearance	of	areas	designated	as	slums,	allowing	private	developers	to	rebuild	these	communities	in	their	vision.	Far	too	often	this	redevelopment	meant	the	complete	demolition	of	the	existing	buildings	and	amenities	in	the	community,	so	the	developers	could	recreate	the	space	in	their	image.	Of	course,	this	process	of	eliminating	blighted	areas	resulted	in	thousands	of	displaced	working-class	New	Yorkers,	dispersing	refugees	across	the	outer	boroughs	of	the	city.	In	this	sense,	slum	clearance	was	an	instrument	of	social	engineering,	though	Moses	and	his	colleagues	expressed	little	sympathy	or	consideration	of	the	impact	of	these	urban	renewal	processes.			 In	order	to	designate	these	communities	as	eligible	for	urban	renewal,	Moses	utilizes	the	definition	of	a	slum	from	the	US	Housing	Act	of	1937,	which	stated	that	“the	term	‘slum’	means	any	area	where	dwellings	predominate	which,	by	reason	of	dilapidation,	
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overcrowding,	faulty	arrangement	or	design,	lack	of	ventilation,	light	or	sanitation	facilities,	or	any	combination	of	these	factors,	are	detrimental	to	safety,	health	or	morals”	(Chronopoulos	2014).	To	communicate	these	sites	as	slums	and	therefore	deserving	of	redevelopment,	the	Committee	on	Slum	Clearance	sought	to	photograph	these	sites	as	communities	in	disrepair	and	beyond	a	state	of	rehabilitation.	As	urban	historian	Themis	Chronopoulos	describes,	“many	of	these	photographs	emphasized	elements	that	made	the	built	environment	appear	disorderly,	obsolete,	and	beyond	repair.	These	principles	favored	the	clearance	of	entire	sites	rather	than	the	partial	redevelopment	of	blighted	spots.”	In	this	sense,	Moses	utilized	documentary	photography	to	brand	the	urban	environment	of	working-class	people	as	disorderly	and	dispensable	and	prime	for	redevelopment.	The	brochures	described	various	considerations	such	as	land	use,	the	condition	and	age	of	existing	structures,	land	coverage,	existing	zoning,	population	density,	and	tenant	data,	however	in	each	case	their	primary	argument	was	that	the	valuable	space	was	being	underutilized,	and	the	city	needed	to	redevelop	the	area	to	better	epitomize	the	modern	city.	As	Samuel	Zipp,	author	of	Manhattan	Projects:	The	Rise	and	Fall	of	Urban	Renewal	in	
Cold	War	New	York	described,	city	powerholders	believed	that	urban	renewal	“could	deliver	the	proper	cityscape	of	a	world-class	city,	underwrite	the	city’s	status	as	an	icon	of	global	power,	and	make	it…	the	capital	of	international	modernity”	(Chronopoulos	2014).			 By	photographing	empty	lots	and	poorly	constructed	fences,	these	brochures	presented	these	communities	as	visually	unattractive	and	reinforced	the	assumption	that	there	was	something	wrong	with	these	areas.	As	Chronopoulos	notes,	“there	was	nothing	more	uneconomic	than	the	absence	of	a	building	in	a	dense	urban	area.	The	fact	that	the	missing	building	had	not	been	replaced	by	another	one	inferred	that	the	owners	of	the	land	
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and	potential	lending	institutions	did	not	consider	the	area	as	commercially	viable.”	But	this	assumption	fails	to	consider	other	reasons	for	these	landowners	to	not	replace	vacant	lots	with	new	buildings,	such	as	a	lack	of	economic	opportunity	or	personal	choice.	This	assumption	also	disregards	the	possibility	that	landowners	were	discriminated	against	by	lending	institutions,	making	the	development	of	empty	lots	nearly	impossible.			 In	addition	to	representing	slums	as	characterized	by	empty	lots	and	unattractive	fences,	Moses’s	Committee	on	Slum	Clearance	also	portrayed	abandoned	buildings	as	a	manifestation	of	urban	blight,	representing	a	lack	of	economic	opportunity	and	a	stagnation	of	profitability	of	these	buildings.	The	photographs	disregarded	the	possibility	that	the	owners	simply	lacked	the	capital	to	maintain	these	units	to	a	state	considered	modern	by	the	general	public,	not	out	of	personal	choice.	Additionally,	the	brochures	showed	back	alleys	filled	with	heavily	utilized	clotheslines,	and	ground	littered	with	garbage,	exhibiting	a	sense	of	visual	chaos.	Chronopoulos	argues	that	the	photographs	also	portrayed	these	areas	as	dirty,	“from	a	public	health	point	of	view,	people	who	existed	alongside	these	back	alleys	probably	lived	in	unhygienic	conditions.	The	images	of	back	alleys	also	asserted	that	the	buildings	of	different	owners	were	too	close	to	each	other	and	that	no	building	improvement	would	be	able	to	alter	this.	The	only	possible	remedy	was	that	of	site	clearance.”			 Through	his	Committee	on	Slum	Clearance	of	the	City	of	New	York,	Robert	Moses	effectively	portrayed	historically	neglected	and	disadvantaged	neighborhoods	as	dilapidated	and	dirty,	and	in	need	of	redevelopment.	The	Committee’s	brochures	on	slum	clearance	demonstrated	communities	as	plagued	with	abandoned	buildings	and	empty	lots,	all	together	failed	to	include	the	narratives	of	the	thousands	of	residents	of	these	
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communities,	who	were	being	effectively	obliterated	from	their	homes.	According	to	Omar	Freilla,	Moses’s	“application	of	federal	‘urban	renewal’	and	‘slum	clearance’	programs	reshuffled	the	neighborhoods	of	New	York	City,	creating	new	housing	opportunities	for	wealthy	whites.	But	the	net	effect	of	his	projects	was	even	greater	than	could	have	been	imagined	and	was	to	have	far-reaching	consequences”	(Freilla	2004).		 Robert	Moses	epitomizes	the	environmental	justice	concerns	of	private	housing	development	as	much	as	any	figure	in	New	York	City	history.	His	vision	of	“urban	renewal”	and	“slum	clearance”	displaced	nearly	a	quarter	of	a	million	New	Yorkers,	a	disproportionate	majority	of	who	were	poor	Latinos	and	African	Americans.	Specifically	targeting	unsuspected	communities	that	lacked	the	resources	to	defend	against	the	charge	of	urban	blight,	Moses	represents	the	symbol	of	all	that	is	wrong	with	government	planning.	For	the	communities	that	Moses	displaced	with	his	“urban	renewal”	projects,	Moses’s	legacy	is	one	of	racism	and	classism,	forced	removals,	the	splitting	of	neighborhoods,	economic	depression,	and	increased	pollution	(Freilla	2004).			
Robert	Moses’s	Highway	Projects:	Motorization	and	Displacement	Robert	Moses	is	notorious	for	his	priority	of	highway	construction	and	suburbanization,	despite	the	various	ramifications	these	projects	had	on	the	residents	of	the	land	where	the	highways	were	to	be	laid.	As	Moses	himself	argued	in	a	1954	statement	to	the	President’s	Advisory	Committee	on	a	National	Highway	Program,	urban	expressways	“must	go	right	through	cities	and	not	around	them.	When	you’re	operating	in	an	overbuilt	metropolis	you	have	to	hack	your	way	with	a	meat	axe”	(Mohl	2002).	Though	the	main	goal	of	Moses’s	highway	projects	was	to	address	urban	traffic	congestion	issues,	a	secondary	
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aim	of	Moses	and	his	conspirators	was	to	promote	urban	redevelopment	projects	that	would	flatten	slums	and	revitalize	blighted	communities.		The	creation	of	massive	highways	in	the	New	York	Metropolitan	Area	displaced	thousands	of	low-income	New	Yorkers,	devastating	countless	working	class	communities.	Moses’s	Cross	Bronx	Expressway,	for	example,	gouged	a	huge	trench	across	a	primarily	working-class	Jewish	community	of	East	Tremont,	which	not	only	displaced	these	residents	from	their	homes	but	also	triggered	the	rapid	decline	of	the	South	Bronx,	still	very	apparent	today	(Mohl	2002).	The	development	of	the	Cross	Bronx	Expressway	also	represents	Moses’s	lack	of	care	for	the	displacement	of	communities,	given	his	determination	to	bisect	the	neighborhood.	As	the	New	York	Times	reported	in	1963,	Moses	refused	a	proposal	to	run	the	expressway	along	the	boundary	of	nearby	Crotona	Park,	which	would	have	saved	1,530	apartments	at	no	additional	cost	(NY	Times	Editorial	Board	1963).	By	then	it	was	too	late	–	the	Cross	Bronx	Expressway	had	been	laid	directly	through	the	neighborhood	in	1960,	and	within	a	few	years,	crime	had	become	commonplace.	As	Robert	Caro,	author	of	The	Power	Broker,	a	Pulitzer	Prize	winning	biography	of	Robert	Moses	observed,	“after	seven	o’clock,	the	residential	streets	of	East	Tremont	are	deserted,	roamed	by	narcotic	addicts	in	gangs	like	packs	of	wolves”	(Caro	1975).			 The	construction	of	the	Cross	Bronx	Expressway	represented	Moses’s	mentality	towards	the	various	communities	that	stood	between	Moses	and	the	infrastructure	he	sought	to	create.	His	refusal	to	redirect	the	portion	of	the	expressway	in	East	Tremont	indicates	Moses’s	disregard	for	working	alongside	community	organizers	and	activists.	According	to	Anthony	Flint,	author	of	Wrestling	with	Moses,	the	construction	of	the	Cross	Bronx	Expressway	“represented	Moses’s	dominance	over	neighborhood	objections…	the	
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Cross	Bronx	Expressway	broke	up	thriving	and	diverse	immigrant	enclaves	and	jump-started	the	economic	and	social	decline	of	the	Bronx”	(Flint	2011).			 While	urban	expressways	certainly	contribute	to	the	economic	vitality	of	cities	and	stimulate	growth,	their	ability	to	reduce	traffic	congestion	has	been	questioned	by	various	scholars.	In	her	most	influential	book,	The	Death	
and	Life	of	Great	American	Cities,	urban	theorist	Jane	Jacobs	criticizes	Moses	for	his	construction	of	aboveground	expressways	within	New	York	and		 				Figure	Three:	East	Tremont,	the	Bronx	other	cities.	Jacobs	argued,	“instead	of	serving	as	bypassers,	expressways	in	cities	serve	too	frequently	as	dumpers.	Mr.	Moses’s	proposed	plan…	is	always	presented	appealingly	as	a	fast	route	to	keep	traffic	out	of	the	city…	[and	yet]	by	accommodating	traffic	aimed	at	the	heart	of	the	city,	it	will	actually	tend	to	choke	up	city	bypass	traffic”	(Jacobs	1992).	In	this	way,	the	urban	freeways	that	Moses	promoted	have	actually	exacerbated	traffic	congestion,	while	also	encouraging	a	steady	increase	of	truck	traffic	and	bottlenecking	throughout	New	York’s	most	industrial	neighborhoods.	As	Omar	Freilla	described,	“Moses’s	celebrated	highways	unleashed	forces	that	gutted	stable	neighborhoods	and	sent	marginal	ones	careening	over	the	edge.	They	provided	the	city’s	white	middle	class	with	an	escape	route	made	of	long,	clean	stretches	of	road	to	the	mythic	garden	paradise	of	suburbia,	just	as	the	city’s	manufacturing	base	was	beginning	to	erode”	(Freilla	2004).	Freilla	also	recounted	
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how	this	suburbanization	exacerbated	income	inequality,	“the	gap	between	rich	and	poor	ballooned,	and	the	entire	city	suffered	as	statewide	political	power	shifted	north	and	east,	following	the	white	exodus	into	suburban	single-family	homes.	New	York	City	would	be	left	isolated	for	decades	with	a	crumbling	infrastructure,	a	traffic-jammed	nightmare	of	roads,	and	a	deserted	population	not	found	on	anyone’s	agenda	at	the	state.”	As	the	creation	of	freeways	and	automobile-oriented	developments	took	center	stage,	mass	transit	was	relegated	to	a	secondary	economic	function.	Public	funds	raised	through	private	investment	was	primarily	attracted	to	highway-based	transportation,	generating	an	abundance	of	secure	investment	economic	development	opportunities,	while	limiting	the	ability	for	mass	transit	to	secure	the	accumulation	of	much	needed	capital	(Cohen	1991).			 Without	the	ability	to	acquire	necessary	funding	for	system	expansion	or	rehabilitation,	the	Transit	Authority	was	forced	to	yield	to	the	automobile	as	the	driving	force	of	urban	development.	In	this	case,	capital	markets	and	investment	opportunity	were	the	most	impactful	variables	driving	the	management	of	the	subway	system.	By	the	late	1960s,	Robert	Moses’s	reign	of	authority	was	coming	to	an	end,	along	with	a	halt	in	highway	construction	nationwide.	As	outlined	in	chapter	two,	transit	investment	priorities	shifted	drastically	during	the	late	1960s	and	1970s	under	the	formation	of	the	Metropolitan	Transportation	Authority	(MTA),	focusing	on	system	expansion	and	neglecting	service	improvements.	While	the	neglect	and	degradation	of	the	subway	during	this	period	impacted	all	New	Yorkers	and	led	to	a	decline	in	ridership	throughout	the	system,	the	inability	to	create	new	subway	lines	has	hurt	low-income	New	Yorkers	the	most.	The	following	chapter	will	examine	the	impact	of	recent	the	economic	recession	of	the	early	1990s	on	transit	inequity	in	New	York	City.		
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Chapter	Four:	Gentrification,	Displacement	and	Employment	Shifts:		
New	York	City	since	1990	
		 Various	historical	developments	and	policy	decisions	have	impacted	transportation	access	in	the	New	York	City	metropolitan	area	over	the	course	of	the	past	two	and	a	half	decades.	The	economic	recession	that	ravaged	the	United	States	in	the	early	1990s	significantly	impacted	New	York’s	job	market,	affecting	employment	patterns	that	would	ultimately	reshape	the	way	New	Yorkers	commute.	The	recession	also	enabled	a	restructuring	of	housing	markets,	facilitated	in	part	by	targeted	federal	expenditures	that	serve	to	expand	patterns	of	gentrification	(Wyly	and	Hammel	1999).	Spatially	targeted	mechanisms,	that	Wyly	and	Hammel	call	“e-zones”	are	determined	for	their	potential	for	economic	development,	and	subsequently	subsidized	to	encourage	‘revitalization’	by	more	affluent	residents.	Gentrification	has	continued	to	displace	low-income	residents	to	isolated	regions	of	the	outer	boroughs	where	people	have	less	access	to	public	transportation,	leading	to	social	exclusion	and	economic	stagnation.		In	this	chapter,	I	argue	that	postrecession	gentrification,	coupled	with	discriminatory	housing	policies	of	the	federal	government	in	the	1990s	and	early	2000s;	enabled	developers	to	decimate	once	stable	low-income	communities,	leading	to	the	displacement	and	social	exclusion	of	these	neighborhoods’	residents.	A	shift	in	employment	patterns	in	New	York	City	during	the	1990s	transformed	the	commuting	patterns	of	low-income	New	Yorkers.	Manhattan	experienced	a	significant	loss	in	available	jobs,	while	employment	in	the	outer	boroughs	rose.	These	postrecession	changes	in	housing	and	employment	have	made	New	York’s	public	transportation	increasingly	inadequate	for	low-income	residents,	who	are	insufficiently	served	by	the	subway	and	need	superior	inter-borough	service	in	order	to	make	possible	the	opportunity	for	upward	mobility.	This	
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chapter	will	begin	by	documenting	the	rise	of	gentrification,	leading	to	displacement	and	isolation	of	low-income	residents,	as	a	result	of	the	economic	recession	and	federal	housing	policies	of	the	early	1990s.	The	next	section	will	consider	the	impact	of	political	governance	at	the	city	and	state	level	during	the	1990s	and	early	2000s,	and	how	decisions	by	these	individuals	affected	housing,	employment,	and	transportation	policies.	The	chapter	will	conclude	by	analyzing	the	changing	job	markets	of	New	York	City	and	how	employment	shifts	since	1990	have	mounted	pressure	on	the	city’s	bus	system,	illuminating	the	need	for	improved	transit	service	in	the	city’s	outer	boroughs.			
Gentrification	in	New	York	City,	1990	to	Present	
	 Understood	as	the	transformation	of	a	neighborhood	or	space	for	more	affluent	residents,	gentrification	has	been	a	major	focus	of	urban	land	use	literature	for	decades	–	particularly	in	New	York	City.	Many	scholars	have	studied	the	relationship	between	real	estate	development	and	gentrification	(Hackworth	2002),	as	well	as	the	consequential	neighborhood	revitalization	that	accompanies	urban	renewal	(Wyly	and	Hammel	1999)	(Smith	2002),	for	both	its	positive	impacts	to	a	community	and	its	many	negative	repercussions.	Scholarship	examining	the	impact	of	gentrification	and	displacement	on	public	transit	accessibility	is	far	less	common.	This	study	contributes	to	the	conversation	on	gentrification	and	displacement/social	exclusion	in	New	York	City,	adding	to	the	dialogue	a	consideration	of	how	these	processes	impact	mobility	and	modal	opportunity.			 Gentrification,	as	a	social	phenomenon,	has	occurred	in	New	York	City	for	decades.	As	early	as	the	late	nineteenth	century,	businesses	and	wealthy	mercantiles	began	moving	into	areas	in	downtown	Manhattan	previously	occupied	by	low-income	communities	and	
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consequentially	displacing	these	residents	to	upper	Manhattan	and	the	Bronx.	During	the	1960s	and	1970s,	various	Manhattan	neighborhoods	such	as	SoHo	and	the	Upper	West	Side	became	gentrified	by	affluent	residents	who	returned	to	the	city	after	their	exodus	to	the	suburbs	a	few	decades	prior.	Contemporary	gentrification	literature	suggests	that	the	gentrification	that	resulted	from	the	economic	recession	of	the	early	1990s	initiated	a	restructuring	of	the	process	itself,	operating	differently	than	it	had	before.	Several	factors	facilitated	this	change,	including	deregulation	in	finance	during	the	1980s	(Squires	1992),	an	expansion	of	credit,	including	subprime	lending	(Harvey	2006),	and	a	reorientation	of	economies	predominantly	focused	on	manufacturing	and	trade	towards	real	estate	(Fainstein	1994).	According	to	sociologist	Jason	Hackworth,	postrecession	gentrification	operates	differently	than	gentrification	patterns	prior	to	the	recession	because	of	a	restructuring	in	the	real	estate	industry,	giving	corporate	developers	the	ability	to	initiate	the	gentrification	process;	the	openness	of	local	and	federal	government	to	approve	housing	policy	and	rezone	neighborhoods;	and	the	marginalization	of	oppositional	movements	to	the	urban	redevelopment	process	(Hackworth	2002).		 By	the	mid-1990s,	corporate	real	estate	agencies	had	acquired	the	capital	and	political	clout	to	acquire	large	swaths	of	previously	industrial	land	and	rezone	it	for	residential	development.	Local,	state	and	federal	government	also	shifted	their	policies	to	encourage	real	estate	development	in	areas	considered	underutilized.	The	Queens	West	Project,	a	1982	mixed-use	plan	to	redevelop	the	industrial	neighborhood	of	Long	Island	City,	is	one	of	the	best	examples	of	government	espousal	of	the	gentrification	process.	Primarily	an	industrial	and	commercial	neighborhood,	Long	Island	City	posed	various	obstacles	to	developers	such	as	inconsistencies	in	zoning	and	complications	with	mortgage	
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insurance	policies.	The	success	of	the	Queens	West	Project	was	made	possible	by	advocacy	from	ex-public	officials	and	the	support	of	the	Federal	Housing	Administration	(FHA),	who	agreed	to	provide	mortgage	insurance	to	the	project	in	1996	(Passell	1996).	The	support	of	the	FHA	signaled	a	shift	of	the	federal	government	towards	heightened	support	of	the	real	estate	industry,	ultimately	indicating	the	federal	government’s	backing	of	the	gentrification	process.		In	addition	to	the	many	negative	ramifications	that	gentrification	has	on	a	community,	several	scholars	have	also	noted	the	possible	benefits	it	can	have.	If	gentrification	can	occur	without	causing	widespread	displacement,	it	has	the	potential	to	increase	socioeconomic,	racial	and	ethnic	integration,	desegregating	urban	areas	and	eventually	school	districts	(Lee,	Spain,	and	Umberson	1985).	Existing	residents	can	also	benefit	from	the	infusion	of	residents	with	more	political	influence,	as	they	can	help	the	community	acquire	better	pubic	services,	and	gentrification	may	also	bring	new	housing	investment	and	stimulate	retail	and	cultural	services	(Freeman	and	Braconi	2004).	While	these	potential	benefits	are	promising,	they	are	often	thwarted	by	the	displacement	of	low-income	residents	and	the	resulting	erosion	of	cultural	identity	and	unity.	Several	studies	have	suggested	that	gentrification	may	not	always	directly	displace	residents,	if	newcomers	are	moving	into	apartments	that	are	already	vacant,	though	the	gentrification	process	may	encourage	low-income	residents	to	not	move	into	a	gentrifying	community	if	they	were	not	already	living	there	(Vigdor,	Massey,	and	Rivlin	2002).	And	though	gentrification	may	not	always	be	directly	displacing	residents	from	their	communities,	it	is	increasing	the	average	rent	burden	for	poor	households	living	in	gentrifying	neighborhoods	(Freeman	and	Braconi	2004),	and	if	gentrification	occurs	on	a	wide	enough	scale	it	could	also	result	in	a	gradually	
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shrinking	pool	of	available	affordable	housing,	exacerbating	the	existing	housing	and	transportation	problems	of	the	poor.			 Studies	evaluating	displacement	resulting	from	gentrification	express	that	the	process	impacts	the	most	vulnerable	members	of	society	the	most.	According	to	a	2006	study	by	Kathe	Newman	and	Elvin	K.	Wyly,	displacement	is	more	common	among	the	foreign-born,	female-headed	households,	those	in	poverty,	and	those	in	older-age	groups.	Similarly,	renters	living	in	substandard	units	or	in	seriously	overcrowded	homes	are	more	likely	to	have	been	displaced,	compared	to	those	who	are	more	satisfied	with	their	housing	conditions	who	are	less	likely	to	have	been	displaced	by	gentrification	processes	(Newman	and	Wyly	2006).	These	displaced	residents	were	forced	to	move	further	outward	in	the	outer	boroughs,	isolating	them	from	the	public	transportation	network	and	from	education	and	employment	opportunities.	According	to	Newman	and	Wyly,	as	the	1990s	proceeded	displacement	effects	appear	in	more	parts	of	Brooklyn,	Queens	and	the	Bronx,	as	renters	were	forced	to	seek	homes	further	from	the	central	business	district	in	areas	that	they	could	afford	(Newman	and	Wyly	2006).	They	also	conducted	ethnographic	interviews	with	residents,	discussing	the	impacts	of	gentrification	on	their	communities.			 In	Newman	and	Wyly’s	study,	a	Latina	former	resident	of	Lower	Park	Slope	described	her	displacement	from	the	neighborhood.	“In	1999	my	landlord	doubled	the	rent	in	the	apartment	but	we	didn’t	understand	why…	My	rent	went	from	$750	to	$1200.	So	he	almost	doubled	it…	He	put	trees	on	it,	fixed	the	gates	and	then	sends	everybody	a	letter	saying	the	rent	doubled.	It	wasn’t	that	he	wanted	to	make	it	nice	for	us.	That’s	where	gentrification	affects	people.	He	was	making	it	look	better	and	fixing	it	up	but	he	was	doing	it	with	a	mission	to	put	in	luxury	condos	for	other	people”	(Newman	and	Wyly	2006).	Many	
	 60	
displaced	residents	were	forced	to	leave	the	city	altogether,	and	others	who	remained	were	relegated	to	the	city’s	shelter	system.	In	July	2003,	more	than	38,000	people,	including	more	than	16,500	children,	used	the	New	York	City	shelter	system,	far	exceeding	the	last	peak	of	28,737	in	March	1987	(The	Supportive	Housing	Network	of	New	York	2003).			 For	displaced	residents	lucky	enough	to	not	be	pushed	out	of	the	city	or	into	the	city’s	shelter	system,	the	vast	majority	has	been	concentrated	in	neighborhoods	where	poverty	is	rampant.	According	to	a	study	conducted	by	the	Community	Service	Society	of	New	York	in	2008,	half	of	the	city’s	1.4	million	poor	people	lived	in	neighborhoods	where	the	poverty	rate	was	at	least	24.8	percent,	while	one-quarter	lived	in	neighborhoods	where	the	rate	was	at	least	34.1	percent	(Community	Service	Society	2008).	These	poverty	pockets	are	predominantly	in	Upper	Manhattan,	the	South	Bronx,	and	Central	Brooklyn,	areas	where	public	transportation	is	primarily	designed	to	bring	workers	into	Manhattan’s	central	business	district,	and	fails	to	account	for	the	thousands	of	workers	whose	jobs	are	within	their	borough	or	in	another	outer	borough.	For	this	reason,	communities	have	developed	alternative	forms	of	transportation	–	such	as	Brooklyn’s	Ultra-Orthodox	Jews	who	travel	on	a	specific	B110	bus	between	homes	in	Williamsburg	and	Borough	Park,	and	the	‘gypsy’	cabs	that	have	become	commonplace	in	Black	and	Afro-Caribbean	communities	in	Brooklyn	and	the	Bronx	(Krase	2016),	though	an	analysis	of	these	specific	transportation	remedies	is	outside	the	scope	of	this	study.			 	
Gentrification	as	a	Manifestation	of	Neoliberalism		 Several	scholars	have	identified	the	third	wave	of	gentrification,	spanning	from	the	early	1990s	economic	recession	to	the	collapse	of	the	housing	market	in	2008	(though	
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arguably	persisting	through	today),	as	a	manifestation	of	the	neoliberal	changes	in	real	estate	and	federal	urban	housing	policy.	Now	an	area	of	significant	economic	importance	for	cities	as	revenue	producers,	gentrifying	neighborhoods	are	advanced	not	only	through	increased	movement	of	affluent	residents	into	inner	city	neighborhoods,	but	through	a	larger	process	of	corporate	real	estate	developers	and	the	politicians	that	aid	and	abed	this	process.	Scholars	Kenneth	Gould	and	Tammy	Lewis	argue	that	Mayor	Michael	Bloomberg	instituted	the	neoliberal,	social	equity-blind	urban	greening	of	New	York	City	(Gould	and	Lewis	2017).	Bloomberg’s	Administration	is	notorious	for	their	close	relationship	with	real	estate	developers	and	their	interests.		In	particular,	local	politicians	have	played	a	prominent	role	in	this	recent	wave	of	gentrification,	through	land	assembly,	tax	incentives,	property	condemnation	and	the	adjustment	of	zoning	laws	(Hackworth	and	Smith	2001).	These	rezoning	policies	were	most	apparent	during	the	Bloomberg	Administration,	which	implemented	dozens	of	neighborhood-scale	rezoning’s	to	catalyze	economic	growth	and	lay	the	foundation	for	new	residential	development	(Goldberg	2011).	This	facilitation	and	promotion	of	free	markets	within	the	context	of	urban	planning	and	housing	is	key	to	neoliberalism,	as	Historian	David	Harvey	(2010)	argues,	“the	[neoliberal]	ideology	rested	upon	the	idea	that	free	markets,	free	trade,	personal	initiative,	and	entrepreneurialism	were	the	best	guarantors	of	individual	liberty	and	freedom	and	that	the	‘nanny	state’	should	be	dismantled	for	the	benefit	of	all…	The	interests	of	the	people	were	secondary	to	the	interests	of	capital,	and	in	the	event	of	a	conflict	between	them,	the	interests	of	the	people	had	to	be	sacrificed”	(Harvey	2010).	In	this	sense,	neoliberalism	privileges	the	growth	of	GDP	and	market	transactions	as	the	ultimate	measure	of	success,	disregarding	the	importance	of	basic	
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human	rights	of	housing	and	access.	Gentrification,	as	the	driving	agent	of	this	process,	sends	a	clear	message	to	those	who	are	victims	of	its	plight:	that	poor	people,	who	in	New	York	are	predominantly	immigrants	and	people	of	color,	are	not	welcome	in	New	York	City	unless	they	have	financial	benefit	to	offer	the	city.			
The	Role	of	Government	in	Postrecession	Gentrification		 The	role	of	the	federal	and	New	York	City	governments	have	been	fundamental	to	the	post	late	1980s	economic	recession-induced	wave	of	gentrification	in	NYC.	After	decades	of	disinvestment	of	cities	by	the	federal	government,	the	imperative	to	generate	tax	dollars	had	become	as	pressing	for	city	governments	as	ever	(Hackworth	and	Smith	2001).	Following	the	economic	despair	of	cities	in	the	1970s	and	into	the	1980s,	banks	became	weary	of	lending	to	city	governments	unless	they	held	a	businesslike	ledger	sheet,	and	this	explains	part	of	the	tendencies	towards	neoliberalism	in	the	New	York	City	government.	The	other	major	influences	in	forming	government	policy	are	the	individual	politicians	who	oversaw	the	development	of	New	York	since	the	late	1980s,	in	particular	the	city’s	mayors.			 The	1989	election	of	David	Dinkins,	New	York’s	first	African-American	Mayor,	signaled	a	powerful	shift	from	the	12-year	divisive	market-oriented	policy	under	Ed	Koch.	The	first	and	only	person	of	color	to	serve	as	mayor	of	New	York	City,	Dinkins	represented	a	symbol	of	progressive	change.	With	a	“tremendous	and	growing	commitment”	to	community-based	housing	at	the	center	of	his	platform,	Dinkins	brought	with	him	serious	promise,	though	his	four-year	term	that	paralleled	the	ramifications	of	the	1991	stock	market	crash	proved	to	produce	little	impact.	Inheriting	a	declining	local	economy	with	
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severe	funding	cuts	to	the	electoral	base,	Dinkins	was	unable	to	generate	the	grassroots	enthusiasm	that	carried	him	to	victory	and	by	the	end	of	his	four-year	term	the	Dinkins	administration	showed	few	differences	from	the	policy	agenda	of	the	Koch	administration	before	him	(Sites	1997).	His	failure	to	reform	the	system	in	his	campaign’s	vision	suggests	the	power	of	neoliberalism’s	ideology	in	New	York	City	government.			 Following	Dinkins	was	Mayor	Rudolph	Giuliani,	who	when	elected	in	1993	represented	an	agenda	of	market-oriented	development	policy	that	was	unique	from	those	pursued	by	Koch	or	Dinkins.	According	to	historian	William	Sites,	“Giuliani’s	own	political	themes	have	vividly	echoed	many	of	the	priorities	of	New	York’s	corporate	agenda,	including	greater	subsidies	to	the	financial	sector	and	to	the	Downtown	and	Midtown	Manhattan	CBDs,	weaker	public	oversight	in	land	use,	retrenchment	and	less	equitable	disbursement	of	education	funding,	selective	privatization,	and	the	removal	of	homeless	people	from	publicly	visible	areas”	(Sites	1997).	In	the	context	of	a	changing	New	York	City	real	estate	market,	Giuliani’s	victory	as	New	York’s	mayor	in	1993	also	represented	a	change	in	the	relationship	between	business	and	city	government,	which	historian	Neil	Smith	describes	a	crisis	of	social	reproduction.	“Amidst	a	restructuring	of	the	relationship	between	capital	and	the	state,	a	burgeoning	crisis	of	social	reproduction,	and	heightened	waves	of	political	repression,	there	is	also	a	rescaling	of	urban	practices,	cultures,	and	functions	in	the	context	of	changing	global	relations	and	a	dramatically	altered	fate	of	the	nation-state”	(Smith	2002).			 In	addition	to	loosening	restrictions	on	business	and	providing	tax	incentives	to	seek	the	needs	of	corporate	interests,	the	Giuliani	Administration	became	known	for	being	‘tough	on	crime’.	With	a	44.3	percent	drop	in	felonies	between	1993	and	1997	and	a	60.2	
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percent	drop	in	murders	and	homicides	during	the	same	period,	Giuliani	took	credit	for	New	York	City’s	role	in	reducing	crime	nationwide	(Greene	1999).	Much	of	this	reduction	on	crimes	in	New	York	in	the	mid	1990s	could	be	credited	to	the	appointment	of	William	Bratton,	who	served	as	Giuliani’s	New	York	Police	Department	(NYPD)	Commissioner	from	1994-1997.	Bratton	became	known	for	the	broken	windows	policy	that	he	promoted	throughout	his	tenure	as	NYPD	Commissioner,	a	theory	that	claims	that	if	disorderly	conduct	is	not	suppressed,	it	will	attract	predatory	criminals	to	roam	the	city	at	will	and	lead	to	more	serious	crime	problems.	In	their	1982	article,	“Broken	Windows,”	James	Wilson	and	George	Kelling	describe	the	broken	windows	theory:	“just	as	unrepaired	broken	windows	can	signal	to	people	that	nobody	cares	about	a	building	and	lead	to	more	serious	vandalism,	untended	disorderly	behavior	can	also	signal	that	nobody	cares	about	the	community	and	lead	to	more	serious	disorder	and	crime”	(Wilson	1982).	The	city’s	broken	windows,	zero-tolerance	strategy	had	tangible	impacts	on	crime	reduction	in	only	a	few	years	time,	but	also	created	a	much	more	divisive	police	state	and	made	residents	increasingly	distrusting	of	one	another.	As	the	chief	of	the	New	York	Transit	Police	from	1990	to	1992,	Bratton	pursued	a	transformative	policy	of	quality-of-life	policing	that	was	responsible	for	the	arrests	of	thousands	of	young	New	Yorkers	for	fare	evasion,	which	he	credits	with	greatly	reducing	the	possibility	for	more	serious	subway	crime	(Bratton	1996).	In	reality,	the	program	led	to	the	hyper	criminalization	of	youth	of	color	and	a	program	of	targeting	public	transit	fare	evasion,	which	constituted	the	highest	number	of	arrests	by	the	NYPD	in	2015	–	over	29,000,	92%	of	which	involved	people	of	color	(Bailin	and	Maclin	2016).		
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	 While	Giuliani’s	Administration	promoted	the	‘tough	on	crime’	stance	they	took	in	the	mid	1990s	and	its	ramifications	for	the	country	at	large,	there	is	a	wealth	of	documentation	supporting	a	rampant	charge	in	police	misconduct	and	abuse	in	New	York	City	during	this	time.	The	human	rights	organization,	Amnesty	International,	reported	that	the	total	number	of	citizen	complaints	filed	annually	with	the	Civilian	Complaint	Review	Board	(CCRB)	increased	more	than	60	percent	between	1992	and	1996	(Greene	1999).	To	this	point,	the	Giuliani/Bratton	campaign	contributed	heavily	to	a	divisive	relationship	between	communities	in	New	York	City,	while	mandating	policing	policies	that	are	contrary	to	community	needs	and	basic	human	rights.			
Shifting	Job	Markets	and	Commuting	Trends		 Another	major	shift	in	New	York	City	during	the	1990s	was	changing	employment	patterns,	in	which	workers	are	increasingly	commuting	within	their	borough	or	to	another	outer	borough,	while	employment	in	Manhattan	has	decreased	during	this	time.	According	to	the	Behind	the	Curb	report	produced	by	The	Center	for	an	Urban	Future,	growth	in	the	healthcare	and	education	industries	in	Brooklyn,	Queens	and	the	Bronx	has	outpaced	employment	opportunities	in	Manhattan	since	1990.	The	number	of	Brooklyn	residents	traveling	to	Queens	for	work	has	grown	significantly	since	1990,	compared	to	an	increase	of	only	13	percent	of	those	commuting	to	Manhattan,	while	the	number	of	Bronx	residents	traveling	to	Queens	or	Westchester	County	for	work	grew	by	38	percent	during	this	time.	Two	of	the	most	prominent	industries	experiencing	growth	during	this	period	were	health	care	and	education,	with	significant	development	in	the	outer	boroughs.	According	to	the	Behind	the	Curb	report,	New	York	City	gained	nearly	120,000	jobs	in	those	two	
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sectors	alone	between	2000	and	2009	–	and	this	growth	is	particularly	pronounced	in	New	York’s	outer	boroughs.	During	the	economic	boom	between	2003	and	2008,	Brooklyn	had	a		bigger	percentage	increase	in	jobs	than	Manhattan	did,	while	the	Bronx	gained	3,647	jobs	during	the	economic	recession	of	2008-2009,	during	which	Manhattan	lost	over	100,000	jobs	(Byron	2013).	This	growth	has	increased	the	number	of	workers	commuting	within	their	own	borough	or	in	adjacent	boroughs,	making	the	NYC	subway	an	inadequate	transit	mode	for	New	York’s	changed	economy.		
	
Figure	Four:	the	Center	for	an	Urban	Future,	Behind	the	Curb	(2011)			 “The	transit	system	is	all	optimized	as	if	everybody	works	in	midtown	Manhattan,	south	of	59th	Street,”	said	Jonathan	Peters,	a	transit	expert	at	the	College	of	Staten	Island.	“The	MTA	seems	to	be	under	the	impression	that	all	job	growth	in	the	city	is	still	occurring	in	the	Manhattan	Central	Business	Districts,	but	its	not,”	(Center	for	an	Urban	Future	2011).	
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Indeed,	the	fastest	growing	industries,	health	care,	education	and	manufacturing,	are	all	consistently	moving	towards	parts	of	the	outer	boroughs	that	are	difficult	to	reach	by	the	subway.	Though	Manhattan	is	renowned	for	its	many	hospitals,	particularly	uptown,	the	growth	experienced	since	1990	has	been	in	health	care	facilities	such	as	New	York	Hospital	in	Flushing,	Queens,	who	recently	completed	a	new	wing	as	part	of	a	$210	million	modernization	program,	and	SUNY	Downstate	Medical	Center	in	the	East	Flatbush	neighborhood	of	Brooklyn.	Neither	facility	is	particularly	accessible	by	subway,	and	employees	rely	on	the	city’s	bus	service	to	travel	to	work.			 In	addition	to	health	care,	education	has	seen	impressive	growth	in	the	outer	boroughs.	Between	2000	and	2009	the	New	York	healthcare	industry	saw	85,648	new	jobs	in	health	care	31,789	jobs	in	education	(Center	for	an	Urban	Future	2011).	Manufacturing,	too,	has	experienced	significant	increases	in	outer	borough	employment.	Despite	its	overall	decline	in	the	city,	81,000	manufacturing	jobs	are	now	located	in	hard-to-reach	districts	in	the	outer	boroughs,			 	
	
	
	
Figure	Five:	the	Center	for	an	Urban	Future,	
Behind	the	Curb	(2011)			
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such	as	College	Point	in	northeastern	Queens	and	Maspeth	on	the	Brooklyn/Queens	border.	When	considered	along	with	the	growth	of	airports,	such	as	John	F.	Kennedy	airport	in	southeastern	Queens,	which	provides	over	55,000	jobs,	employment	patterns	have	certainly	changed	since	New	York’s	transit	system	was	created.			 Though	New	York	City	lost	41,833	jobs	between	2000	and	2009,	the	majority	of	this	was	concentrated	in	Manhattan	due	to	the	economic	recession	of	2008.	The	other	four	boroughs	each	experienced	substantial	growth,	particularly	Brooklyn,	the	Bronx,	and	Queens.	For	the	thousands	of	employees	who	now	commute	between	these	boroughs,	the	Subway	simply	is	not	enough.	With	the	subway	proving	inadequate	for	New	York	City’s	modern	job	environment,	more	New	Yorkers	are	traveling	to	work	by	bus.	According	to	the	MTA,	bus	ridership	has	increased	by	60	percent	since	1990,	and	transit	planners	predict	future	increases	of	possibly	30	percent	or	more	per	decade	(Center	for	an	Urban	Future	2011).	This	has	pressured	the	city’s	bus	system,	which	has	seen	a	steady	decline	in	service	over	the	past	couple	decades.	Between	1996	and	2006,	average	bus	speeds	in	New	York	slowed	by	11	percent,	from	9	mph	to	8	mph,	which	is	one	of	the	slowest	averages	in	the	country	(NYC	DOT	2010).	For	those	of	whom	the	bus	is	the	only	option	to	commute	to	work,	service	this	slow	is	a	major	drain	of	time	spent	in	one’s	day,	and	for	a	city	the	size	of	New	York,	it’s	simply	unacceptable.		These	slow	bus	services	contribute	greatly	to	the	horrendous	commutes	that	New	Yorkers	endure.	Residents	of	New	York	City	already	have	amongst	the	longest	commutes	in	the	country,	and	low-income	New	Yorkers	are	much	more	likely	to	have	long	commutes	than	any	other	group	in	the	city.	Two	thirds	of	New	Yorkers	who	commute	more	than	an	hour	to	
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work	earn	less	than	$35,000	annually,	and	immigrants	and	people	of	color	are	much	more	likely	than	white	New	Yorkers	to	have	long	commutes.			 									
Figure	Six:	the	Center	for	an	Urban	Future,	Behind	the	Curb	(2011)	
	
	 For	the	millions	of	New	Yorkers	who	live	in	the	outer	boroughs	and	rely	on	the	bus	to	commute	to	jobs	within	their	borough,	the	service	is	simply	not	to	par	with	that	of	the	subway,	and	like	the	subway	–	the	bus	fails	to	provide	adequate	interborough	connections.	While	the	bus	operates	as	the	main	mode	of	transit	for	outer	borough	residents	who	work	within	their	own	borough,	it	fails	to	provide	adequate	service	to	workers	who	commute	to	other	outer	boroughs.		
Figure	Seven:	the	Center	for	an	Urban	Future,		
Behind	the	Curb	(2011)	
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According	to	the	Behind	the	Curb	study,	the	number	of	commuters	who	cross	the	border	between	Brooklyn	and	Queens	has	increased	by	15	percent	since	1990,	with	nearly	160,000	commuters	making	the	trip	daily.	Only	9	percent	use	the	bus,	without	the	majority	either	driving	and	taking	a	subway	to	Manhattan	and	transferring.										With	a	subway	system	that	is	failing	to	meet	the	needs	of	a	changing	outer	borough	economy	and	a	bus	system	that	is	seeing	increased	ridership,	the	City	needs	to	establish	better	and	more	efficient	ways	to	get	residents	from	their	homes	to	work.	One	proposal	that	has	gained	traction	is	the	implementation	of	Bus	Rapid	Transit,	a	proven	model	of	highly	efficient	express	bus	service	that	was	first	introduced	in	Curitiba,	Brazil,	in	1974.	Responding	to	the	need	of	New	York’s	changing	job	landscape	and	commuter	trends,	the	Pratt	Center	for	Community	Development	published	a	report,	titled	Mobility	and	Equity:	Impact	of	Transit	Deficits	for	New	York’s	Underserved	Neighborhoods,	which	made	the	case	for	bus	rapid	transit	in	New	York.	The	Pratt	Center	report	identifies	the	major	areas	of	job	growth	over	the	past	couple	decades,	expressing	the	dire	need	for	improving	inter-borough	transit	options.		
Figure	Eight:	Pratt	Center	for	Community	Development,	Mobility	and	Equity	for	NYCs	Transit	Starved	Neighborhoods	(2013)	
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Mapping	Transit	Inequity	When	I	began	my	research	on	this	thesis	paper,	I	was	particularly	interested	in	how	maps	could	be	employed	to	express	issues	of	transit	equity.	In	order	to	document	how	a	lack	of	accessibility	to	public	transportation	disproportionately	impacts	low-income	residents	and	New	Yorkers	of	color,	I	have	created	a	series	of	maps	using	ESRI’s	Community	Analyst	online	software.	Using	ESRI’s	ArcMap	Geographic	Information	Systems	(GIS)	software,	I	collected	subway	station	shape	files	from	New	York	City’s	OpenData	website,	and	created	quarter-mile	buffers	around	each	station.	For	the	purposes	of	this	study,	a	transit	accessibility	measure	of	0.25	miles	was	implemented,	which	is	comparable	to	the	400	meters	that	transit	scholars	Saghapour,	Moridpour,	and	Thompson	established	in	their	2016	study	(Saghapour,	Moridpour,	and	Thompson	2016).		I	then	interpolated	data	from	ESRI	and	the	American	Community	Survey	(ACS)	into	the	Community	Analyst,	creating	a	series	of	maps	that	explore	the	relationship	between	the	NYC	subway	system	and	low-income	communities	and	communities	of	color.	By	creating	a	series	of	figures	that	reflects	this	disproportionate	access	to	the	New	York	City	subway,	I	hope	to	express	the	very	visceral	cases	of	transportation	injustice	in	New	York	City.			 The	first	figure	appearing	on	the	following	page	is	expressing	census	tracts	of	communities	living	below	the	federal	poverty	level.	Tracts	that	appear	in	orange	range	from	10	percent	to	20	percent	of	residents	living	below	the	poverty	line,	while	the	darkest	shade	of	red	symbolizes	communities	with	over	20	percent	of	the	population	living	in	poverty.	Neighborhoods	in	the	South	Bronx	and	Central	Brooklyn	have	the	highest	concentration	of	residents	living	in	poverty,	and	these	areas	are	also	amongst	the	most	inaccessible	from	the	city’s	subway	system.	
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Map	One:	the	New	York	City	Subway	System	and	Communities	Living	Below	the	Federal	Poverty	Level	
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Map	Two:	the	New	York	City	Subway	System	and	2016	Unemployment	Rates	by	Census	Tract	
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	 In	map	two,	the	quarter	mile	subway	buffers	are	juxtaposed	with	Esri’s	Unemployment	data	for	2016.	This	research	is	primarily	concerned	with	red	census	tracts,	which	represent	neighborhoods	living	with	at	least	44	percent	of	working-age	residents	unemployed	or	without	a	stable	source	of	work.	These	communities	are	most	impacted	by	the	rising	fares	of	NYC	public	transit,	and	are	considered	the	most	transit	dependent	population	in	the	city.	The	most	significant	findings	from	this	map	are	the	predominance	of	communities	without	access	to	employment	opportunities	in	the	outer	boroughs	of	the	city	–	in	areas	that	have	been	historically	marginalized,	quite	literally,	to	areas	inaccessible	to	public	transportation.	In	addition	to	the	antiquated	outer	borough	to	Manhattan	route	formation	of	the	subway,	the	recent	employment	shifts	outlined	in	this	chapter	reflect	why	this	inaccessibility	to	the	subway	leads	to	economic	stagnation	and	unemployment.		This	pattern	of	marginalization	for	low-income	residents	has	a	disturbingly	close	relationship	to	the	racial	makeup	of	New	York’s	outer	boroughs.	Map	Three	reflects	the	current	distribution	of	people	of	color	in	New	York	City,	expressing	an	unequal	distribution	of	transit	resources.	Large	parts	of	the	Bronx,	Eastern	Queens,	and	Southeastern	Brooklyn	are	predominantly	people	of	color,	and	the	subway	system	fails	to	provide	sufficient	access	to	public	transportation	for	these	communities.	In	this	figure,	white	circles	represent	quarter	mile	buffers	around	each	subway	station,	superimposed	onto	census	tracts	representing	the	percentage	of	people	of	color.	Map	Four	and	Map	Five	reflect	specific	distributions	of	Black	residents	and	Hispanic	residents,	expressing	the	subway’s	inability	to	adequately	serve	communities	of	color.			
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	Map	Three:	the	New	York	City	Subway	System	and	2016	Percent	People	of	Color	by	Census	Tract	
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Map	Four:	the	New	York	City	Subway	System	and	2010	Neighborhoods	with	Predominantly	Black	Renters	
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Map	Five:	the	New	York	City	Subway	System	and	2010	Neighborhoods	with	Predominantly	Hispanic	Renters	
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	 	 Maps	Three,	Four	and	Five	reflect	the	disproportionate	lack	of	transit	benefits	that	burden	communities	of	color	in	New	York	City.	In	particular,	maps	four	and	five	respectively	represent	the	distribution	of	Black	renters	and	Hispanic	renters	as	of	the	2010	U.S.	Census,	and	the	dearth	of	subway	stations	in	many	of	these	neighborhoods.	Map	Four	conveys	significant	concentrations	of	Black	residents	in	Southeast	Brooklyn	and	Southeast	Queens,	regions	of	the	city	that	are	generally	underserved	by	the	NYC	subway	system.	These	areas	also	coincide	with	the	distribution	of	neighborhoods	with	high	levels	of	unemployment	represented	in	Map	Two.	Map	Five	indicates	a	similar	concentration	of	Hispanic	residents	in	the	South	Bronx,	Northern	Queens,	and	Southwestern	Brooklyn.	These	neighborhoods	are	generally	in	coastal	and	industrial	areas,	lacking	access	to	decent	public	transportation.			 	 Although	the	subway	system	was	all	but	complete	by	the	end	of	WWII,	and	many	of	these	communities’	demographics	have	changed	significantly	since	then,	this	disproportionate	distribution	of	transit	benefits	is	an	expression	of	environmental	racism.	I	argue	that	the	inability	for	the	Metropolitan	Transportation	Authority	and	New	York	City	government	to	expand	the	subway	system	into	these	underserved	regions,	or	to	provide	adequate	alternative	options,	is	a	manifestation	of	transit	discrimination.	In	future	research,	I	plan	to	delve	deeper	into	studying	ways	to	measure	transit	equity	issues	and	hope	to	expand	on	this	research	by	continuing	this	thesis	of	maps	representing	transit	injustices,	while	also	incorporating	other	variables	such	as	temporal	considerations	and	learning	ways	to	represent	gentrification	and	displacement	historically	in	my	maps.			 	
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Conclusion	In	the	nearly	three	decades	since	the	economic	recession	of	the	early	1990s,	New	York	City	has	experienced	remarkable	changes	in	housing,	employment	and	commuting	patterns,	which	have	exacerbated	public	transit	inequalities	that	were	already	problematic	in	New	York.	This	chapter	has	outlined	the	major	policies	that	have	impacted	where	New	Yorkers	live	and	work,	and	how	they	travel	to	and	from	their	places	of	work.	The	growing	influence	of	neoliberal	planning	policies,	coupled	with	heightened	cooperation	between	the	city’s	mayors	and	the	real	estate	industry,	has	led	to	a	proliferation	of	gentrification	in	New	York’s	outer	boroughs,	displacing	low-income	residents	and	isolating	them	in	neighborhoods	with	inadequate	access	to	public	transportation.	Policing	tactics	introduced	by	Commissioner	Bill	Bratton	have	led	to	the	hypercriminalization	of	New	Yorkers	of	color,	and	fare	evasion	policing	tactics	under	the	city’s	zero	tolerance	policies	has	cost	the	city	a	significant	amount	of	fiscal	resources.	Finally,	a	reformed	economy	has	moved	workers	to	industries	that	are	underserved	by	the	city’s	public	transportation	system,	creating	a	need	for	improved	bus	rapid	service	and	other	efficient	alternatives.		The	following	chapter	will	review	the	various	citizen-driven	community	organizations	that	have	presented	proposals	and	solutions	to	New	York’s	transit	equity	woes.	The	majority	of	these	groups	have	formed	in	response	to	the	increasing	inequalities	in	the	public	transportation	nexus	since	1990,	and	have	gained	traction	in	response	to	a	growing	lack	of	accessibility	and	affordability	of	transportation	in	New	York	City.			
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Chapter	Five:	
TRANSIT	ADVOCACY	ORGANIZATIONS	AND	CITIZEN	PARTICIPATION	
	Over	the	past	few	decades	various	organizations	in	New	York	City	have	advocated	for	heightened	equity	and	fairness	within	public	transportation.	With	a	collective	purpose	of	reforming	the	management	and	structure	of	transit	affordability	and	accessibility,	these	organizations	focus	on	issues	of	accessibility,	affordability,	and	justice	relating	to	New	York	City	public	transportation.	Though	the	four	community	based	movements	discussed	in	this	chapter	each	advocate	for	a	particular	set	of	issues	within	public	transportation	in	New	York	City,	they	are	all	connected	through	their	shared	dedication	to	improving	access	and	affordability	for	the	city’s	most	transit	disadvantaged.		This	chapter	will	begin	by	discussing	the	Fair	Fares	Campaign,	which	proposes	a	discounted	MetroCard	program	for	low-income	New	Yorkers.	I	will	then	review	the	demands	of	The	Coalition	to	End	Broken	Windows,	an	organization	that	calls	for	an	end	to	the	Broken	Windows	policing	philosophy	introduced	by	NYPD	Commissioner	Bill	Bratton	in	the	1990s,	which	has	led	to	the	hyper	criminalization	of	New	Yorkers	of	color.	The	subsequent	section	considers	the	Move	NY	Fair	Plan,	a	partnership	of	organizations	advocating	for	congestion	tolls	on	bridges	entering	Manhattan	to	support	new	mass	transit	services	and	upgrades.	The	chapter	will	conclude	by	reviewing	the	Pratt	Center	for	Community	Development’s	report	making	the	case	for	Bus	Rapid	Transit,	building	on	the	past	success	of	express	buses	in	many	cities’	new	urbanism	approach.		Building	upon	the	distinct	but	interconnected	issues	of	rising	transit	fares;	discriminatory	investment	priorities	by	the	MTA;	a	subway	system	that	fails	to	support	recent	job	growth	in	the	outer	boroughs;	and	hyper	criminalization	of	New	Yorkers	for	fare	evasion;	these	organizations	all	fight	for	one	shared	value:	transportation	justice.	I	argue	
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that	these	community	organizations	are	epitomizing	the	vision	of	planning	the	just	city,	including	public	participation	and	deliberative	democracy	in	their	organizational	philosophy.	All	together	these	organizations	represent	a	cohesive	movement	of	New	Yorkers	who	have	been	discriminated	against	and	left	out	of	the	transit	planning	process,	as	well	as	their	allies,	who	collectively	have	a	unified	vision	–	a	just	and	fair	system	of	transit	that	benefits	us	all.			
“Fair	Fares”	Campaign	for	Reduced-Fare	MetroCards	On	April	10,	2016,	local	transit	advocacy	groups	The	Riders	Alliance	and	The	Community	Service	Society	of	New	York	submitted	a	report	launching	their	“Fair	Fares”	Campaign.	Their	proposal	to	New	York	City	Mayor	Bill	de	Blasio	and	the	City	Council	put	forward	a	program	offering	half-fare	MetroCards	for	riders	below	the	federal	poverty	level	(Bailin	and	Maclin	2016).	The	Fair	Fares	Campaign	is	the	culmination	of	research	discussed	earlier	that	was	conducted	by	the	Community	Service	Society	and	The	Riders	Alliance,	submitted	a	week	after	the	proposal	launch	as	a	report	titled	“The	Transit	Affordability	Crisis.”	In	this	report,	the	organizations	outline	the	burden	that	rising	public	transit	fares	impose	onto	hundreds	of	thousands	of	New	York’s	working	poor.	“For	New	York’s	more	than	300,000	working	poor,	transit	expenses	often	exceed	over	10	percent	of	their	family	budgets,	limiting	their	ability	to	access	jobs	and	forcing	them	to	forgo	other	necessities,”	the	report	states	(Community	Service	Society	2016a).	The	Community	Service	Society	also	conducts	annual	surveys	on	transit	equity	in	New	York	City,	called	“The	Unheard	Third”.	Their	2015	Unheard	Third	Survey	illuminates	a	clear	class	disparity	over	the	modes	commuters	take	to	work.	Poor	New	Yorkers	(those	living	at	or	below	the	federal	poverty	
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line)	are	the	most	transit	dependent,	58%	of	who	rely	on	public	transit	to	get	to	work	and	around	the	city.			 The	near	poor	(which	the	CSS	defines	as	families	living	between	the	federal	poverty	line,	and	2x	the	federal	poverty	line)	are	nearly	as	dependent	on	public	transportation,	using	subways	and	buses	56%	of	the	time.	Moderate	income	and	higher	income	families	rely	on	public	transportation	less,	highlighting	the	fact	that	lower-income	families	are	much	more	dependent	on	public	transportation	and	are	hit	the	hardest	as	fares	increase,	because		 				 Figure	Nine:	The	Community	Service	Society		they	have	fewer	alternatives	to	the	public			 	 	transit	system.			 In	the	public	release	for	the	Fair	Fares	Campaign,	David	R.	Jones,	President	and	CEO	of	the	Community	Service	Society,	referenced	the	critical	need	for	such	a	program.	“Economic	mobility	and	transit	affordability	go	hand	in	hand.	To	get	to	work,	pick	up	your	kids	from	school,	go	to	the	doctor,	to	do	almost	everything	you	need	to	do	in	New	York	City	to	survive	requires	riding	the	subway	or	bus,”	said	Jones.	The	Transit	Affordability	Crisis	report	also	noted	that	respondents	to	the	2015	Unheard	Third	Survey	expressed	that	rising	
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fares	are	the	biggest	problem	with	subways	in	New	York	City,	with	29%	of	respondents	selecting	this	obstacle.		The	rising	costs	of	the	subway	and	bus	fare	in	New	York	City	reflects	the	system’s	increasing	lack	of	affordability	that	compromises	hundreds	of	thousands	of	New	Yorkers’	ability	to	achieve	good	education,	employment,	and	healthcare	opportunities.	In	addition,	the	prohibitive	cost	of	the	subway	or	bus	fares	prevents	low-income	individuals	from	getting	medical	care,	or	exploring	job	opportunities	outside	of	their	community.	According	to	CSS’s	2015	Unheard	Third	Survey,	25%	of	low-income,	working-age	New	Yorkers	report	rising	fares	preventing	them	from	getting	medical	care,	while	34%	of	low-income,	working	age	New	Yorkers	said	they	have	not	sought	employment	outside	their	neighborhood	because	of	prohibitive	public	transportation	costs	(Community	Service	Society	2016a).	This	inability	to	seek	employment	opportunity	outside	one’s	neighborhood	is	particularly	challenging	for	low-income	Latinos,	out	of	whom	43%	expressed	that	public	transit	fares	restrict	their	job	searches	to	a	walking	distance	from	their	homes.		A	particularly	powerful	component	of	the	reports	submitted	by	these	organizations	is	the	personal	accounts	that	their	members	detail,	providing	an	ethnographic	authenticity	that	most	studies	fail	to	consider.	In	“The	Transit	Affordability	Crisis”,	Leslie	W.,	a	44-year	old	substitute	teacher	and	Riders	Alliance	member	from	Central	Harlem	described	the	difficulty	that	rising	transportation	costs	impose	onto	working	class	New	Yorkers.	Occasionally	having	to	decline	jobs	because	of	transit	fares,	Leslie	says	the	rising	costs	of	transit	“feels	like	an	attack”	on	the	working	poor.	“The	hidden	message	is	that	the	working	poor	should	not	be	living	in	New	York	City,”	she	reflected.		
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							Another	Riders	Alliance	member,	Manny	A.,	expressed	similar	sentiments	in	the	Transit	Affordability	Crisis	report.	“You	have	to	go	through	hurdles	to	get	social	services,”	he	said.	Manny	also	reflected	on	the	difficult	choice	many	low-income	New	Yorkers	must	make,	which	is	to	jump	the	turnstile	or	enter	through	an	open	emergency	exit.	“Its	not	an	easy	choice,	and	I’m	not	the	only	one	making	it:	lots	of	people	in	the	neighborhood	are	getting	arrested	for	hopping	the	turnstile.	We	need	a	program	like	this.”	In	fact,	arrests	for	farebeating	are	now	the	most	common	arrest	that	the	NYPD	makes.	According	to	Robert	Gangi,	Director	of	the	Police	Reform	Organizing	Project,	farebeating	arrests	totaled	29,000	in	2015	alone.	92	percent	of	these	arrests	involved	people	of	color	(Bailin	and	Maclin	2016).	“There	arrests	are,	in	effect,	one	of	the	principal	ways	that	the	city	and	the	NYPD	criminalize	low-income	New	Yorkers	of	color,”	said	Gangi.		The	Transit	Affordability	Crisis	also	outlines	precedents	that	already	exist	for	subsidized	public	transit	for	working	Americans.	CSS	cites	the	Seattle	ORCA	Lift	program,	which	offers	half-price	discounts	on	peak	fare	for	Seattle	residents	earning	below	200%	of	the	Federal	Poverty	Line,	and	the	San	Francisco	Low	Income	Lifeline	Pass	and	Free	Muni	service,	a	half-price	monthly	pass	for	the	city’s	bus	system	for	residents	living	below	200%	of	the	Federal	Poverty	Line.	Meanwhile,	the	New	York	City	MTA	already	provides	discounted	MetroCard	rates	for	students,	the	elderly,	and	the	disabled.		In	their	2014	Unheard	Third	survey,	the	Community	Service	Society	found	bipartisan	support	for	their	idea	to	offer	half-price	fares	for	low-wage	workers.	While	the	82%	of	low-income	respondents	who	favor	a	reduced	transit	fare	is	not	surprising,	the	58%	of	moderately	high-income	respondents	who	favor	the	concept	is	promising.	
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Additionally,	64%	of	respondents	who	identify	as	Republican	also	favor	the	idea,	suggesting	that	a	subsidized	transit	fare	program	could	be	quite	popular	in	New	York	City.		
	
Figure	Ten:	The	Community	Service	Society	of	New	York		The	proposal	put	forth	by	The	Riders	Alliance	and	The	Community	Service	Society	of	New	York	called	for	half	price	MetroCards	for	all	city	residents	between	the	ages	of	18	and	64	in	families	with	incomes	below	the	federal	poverty	level.	Though	the	results	of	the	Unheard	Third	surveys	suggest	a	need	for	reduced-fare	transit	opportunities	for	New	Yorkers	living	at	200%	of	the	federal	poverty	level	and	lower,	the	organizations	assume	that	this	proposal	would	more	likely	be	enacted	given	its	lesser	cost	in	revenue.	As	is	the	custom	of	various	public	benefits	administered	by	the	New	York	City	Human	Resources	Administration	(HRA),	the	proposal	assumes	that	participants	in	this	program	would	not	
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be	required	to	be	citizens	or	legal	permanent	residents	to	be	eligible	for	discounted	fares,	and	suggests	that	reduced-fare	MetroCards	be	sold	directly	to	participants	from	the	MTA.		Riders	Alliance	and	CSS	propose	that	state	and	city	funding	sources	be	used	to	cover	the	foregone	farebox	revenues,	estimated	at	roughly	$115	million	during	the	first	year	of	the	program	and	$194	million	during	year	two	once	more	eligible	New	Yorkers	participate.	The	proposal	suggests	several	funding	options	to	make	up	this	cost,	namely	a	statewide	gasoline	tax,	extending	the	current	“millionaire’s	tax”,	or	allocating	funds	from	the	city	budget.	A	proposal	like	this	would	also	alleviate	the	financial	burden	the	City	spends	prosecuting	fare	beaters,	which	the	New	York	Times	estimates	the	City	spent	$50	million	for	in	2016	(NY	Times	Editorial	Board	2017).	The	Times	also	notes	that	reduced-fare	MetroCards	would	also	reduce	the	costs	of	detaining	fare	beaters	at	Rikers	Island	jail,	another	unnecessary	cost	taxpayers	cover	to	criminalize	low-income	New	Yorkers	of	color.		In	a	statement	to	Mayor	Bill	de	Blasio	on	October	19,	2016,	the	Community	Service	Society	of	New	York	and	the	Riders	Alliance,	along	with	24	other	community	organizations,	27	New	York	City	Council	Members,	and	two	elected	officials,	expressed	the	critical	need	for	a	discounted	transit	fares	program.	“Upward	mobility,	made	possible	by	commuting	to	good	jobs	and	higher	educational	opportunities	throughout	our	city,	requires	actual	physical	mobility.	But	that	is	becoming	out	of	reach	for	one	out	of	four	low-income	working-age	New	Yorkers	who	according	to	survey	research	often	cannot	afford	bus	and	subway	fares,”	the	letter	stated.	“The	economic	benefits	of	Fair	Fares	would	help	bridge	the	growing	economic	gap	between	the	wealthy	and	the	poor,	promote	a	fairer	public	transit	system,	and	build	a	more	progressive	city.”		
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The	letter	to	Mayor	de	Blasio	concludes	by	referencing	the	low-income	reduced	fare	programs	that	San	Francisco	and	Seattle	have	adopted,	noting	the	potential	for	New	York	to	be	a	keystone	city	in	the	transit	equity	movement.	“New	York	City	should	lead	the	way	in	ensuring	that	turnstiles	are	the	entry-point,	not	the	barrier,	to	economic	opportunity”	(Community	Service	Society	2016b).			
The	Coalition	to	End	Broken	Windows		 In	response	to	the	various	ways	in	which	the	New	York	Police	Department	(NYPD)	criminalizes	New	Yorkers	of	color,	a	group	of	community	organizations	formed	to	create	The	Coalition	to	End	Broken	Windows.	Uniting	to	create	a	call	to	action	to	mediate	the	injustices	created	by	the	Broken	Windows	zero-tolerance	policing	philosophy	introduced	in	the	1990s	and	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	The	Coalition	to	End	Broken	Windows	has	released	a	list	of	demands	seeking	to	end	quality-of-life	criminalization	and	a	divestment	of	the	New	York	police	force.		According	to	the	coalition’s	website,	the	Broken	Windows	policing	program	targets	subway	or	bus	fare	evasion,	performing	in	the	subway,	sleeping	or	taking	up	two	seats	in	the	subway,	as	well	as	various	other	low-level	civil	crimes.	“Broken	Windows	encourages	police	to	harass,	racially	profile,	entrap,	and	produce	mass	police	interactions,	primarily	but	not	exclusively,	in	low-income	Black	and	Latino	communities.	This	is	often	fueled	by	the	NYPD’s	well-known	quota	system	and	results	in	mass	arrests,	mass	summonses,	lost	work	days,	jail	time,	barriers	to	housing,	loss	of	child	custody	and	even	deportations”	(End	Broken	Windows	Coalition	2017).	This	program	has	continually	targeted	Blacks,	Latinos	
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and	other	people	of	color	in	a	disproportionate	and	discriminatory	manner,	as	well	as	the	homeless,	the	undocumented,	and	LGBT	communities.		Amongst	various	actions	that	the	coalition	demands	on	their	website	is	to	invest	in	poor	communities	of	color	by	creating	a	free	MetroCard	program	for	low-income	New	Yorkers.	They	call	it	the	#SwipeItForward	campaign,	encouraging	residents	with	unlimited	MetroCards	to	offer	others	a	free	swipe	on	their	departure	from	the	subway.	By	helping	their	fellow	New	Yorkers	with	a	free	ride,	the	Swipe	It	Forward	campaign	protects	low-income	residents	from	the	NYPD’s	#1	Broken	Windows	arrest:	fare-evasion.	Distinguishing	this	proposal	from	the	Fair	Fares	proposal	is	the	demand	to	provide	unlimited	MetroCards	for	free	rather	than	half	price,	which	would	be	doubling	the	lost	revenue	for	the	city	but	would	also	reduce	arrests	for	fare	evasion	and	saving	the	NYPD	and	transit	police	millions	as	well.	Though	this	demand	for	free	MetroCards	to	reduce	the	NYPD’s	targeting	of	people	of	color	is	very	understandable,	I	argue	that	the	strategy	that	the	Fair	Fares	campaign	puts	forth	is	more	likely	to	succeed	in	a	polarizing	political	climate	that	condemns	public	support	of	social	services.			 The	End	Broken	Windows	campaign	also	demands	a	subway	performer	‘bill	of	rights’	posted	in	every	subway	station,	to	prevent	the	routine	harassment	and	arrest	of	New	Yorkers	for	performing	in	subway	stations.	The	coalition	references	Busk	NY,	a	subway	performer	advocacy	organization,	which	called	for	a	‘Subway	Performer	Bill	of	Rights’,	pointing	out	the	legality	of	freelance	artistic	performance	in	the	New	York	subway	system	since	1985.	Busk	NY	also	calls	for	a	moratorium	on	all	arrests	and	ticketing	of	performers,	including	those	performing	on	subways	in	operation.	The	End	Broken	Windows	campaign	has	been	endorsed	by	dozens	of	NYC	based	police	reform	community	
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organizations,	including	the	Police	Reform	Organizing	Project	(PROP),	Families	for	Freedom,	and	Black	Lives	Matter	NYC.			 While	the	Coalition	to	End	Broken	Windows	and	the	Fair	Fares	campaigns	both	address	the	rising	lack	of	affordability	of	the	subway,	neither	organization	details	specific	strategies	to	fund	their	proposals.	One	of	the	shortfalls	of	many	community	organizations	faces	is	how	to	find	fiscal	resources	to	support	their	projects,	and	the	following	proposal	would	create	a	very	significant	source	of	funding	for	mass	transit	projects	in	New	York	City.			
Traffic	Congestion	Tolls	to	Fund	Public	Transportation	A	large	concern	of	organizations	working	towards	transit	equity	is	finding	ways	to	fund	projects,	such	as	the	Fair	Fares	proposal	and	other	plans	to	improve	public	transportation	in	New	York	City.	Move	NY,	a	grassroots	coalition	of	neighborhood	groups	and	advocacy	nonprofits,	submitted	a	proposal	to	the	New	York	State	Assembly	called	the	Move	NY	Fair	Plan.	The	Plan	aims	to	mitigate	traffic	congestion,	while	also	creating	a	large	fund	to	improve	transportation	infrastructure	in	New	York	City.	Led	by	former	NYC	traffic	commissioner	Sam	Schwartz,	the	Move	NY	Fair	Plan	recommends	a	$5.54	toll	on	four	East	River	bridges	connecting	Manhattan	with	Queens	and	Brooklyn	–	which	currently	are	free	crossings,	as	well	as	an	equal	toll	for	all	vehicles	crossing	60th	street	in	Manhattan.				
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Figure	Eleven:	The	Move	NY	Fair	Plan	(2015)		By	introducing	tolls	at	these	points	in	the	city,	the	City	would	be	able	to	lower	the	toll	on	several	more	expensive	bridges	by	$3.04	in	each	direction,	and	would	also	create	a	$1.5	billion	transportation	fund	annually	(Fitzsimmons	2015).	Of	this	$1.5	billion	in	anticipated	annual	revenue,	25	percent	would	be	devoted	to	improving	roads	and	bridges,	with	the	remainder	benefitting	service	upgrades	on	the	City’s	worst	subway	and	bus	lines	as	well	as	adding	new	service	in	transit	deserts.	This	proposal	is	monumental	in	its	reach	–	the	added	revenue	to	New	York	City	transportation	projects	would	have	the	potential	for	the	MTA	to	establish	new	routes	in	rapidly	growing	immigrant	communities	currently	devoid	of	public	transportation.		
	 91	
The	Move	NY	Fair	Plan	is	supported	by	New	York	State	Assembly	member	Robert	J.	Rodriguez,	a	representative	of	East	Harlem.	Rodriguez	introduced	legislation	to	create	a	$4.5	billion	Transit	Gap	Investment	Fund,	specifically	to	alleviate	transportation	issues	in	transit	deserts,	many	areas	of	Queens,	south	Brooklyn	and	Staten	Island,	which	currently	are	underserved	by	buses	and	not	served	at	all	by	the	subway.	The	Fund	would	create	new	bus	service	and	reduce	fares	on	express	buses,	and	would	also	provide	funding	to	neighborhood	community	boards	to	invest	in	local	projects	like	bike	lanes,	bus	depots,	public	plazas	and	station	repairs	(NY	Times	Editorial	Board	2016).	“It’ll	go	towards	real,	localized	projects,	ones	identified	and	prioritized	and	decided	upon	at	the	community	level,”	explained	Assembly	member	Rodriguez.	“It	changes	how	decisions	about	transportation	are	made	historically”	(McArdle	2016).		One	of	the	promising	proposals	for	new	subway	lines	is	the	Triboro	Rx,	hypothesized	by	the	Regional	Plan	Association	(RPA)	to	connect	Brooklyn,	Queens	and	the	Bronx.	Currently	there	is	no	rail	that	links	the	three	boroughs,	but	supporters	are	encouraged	that	the	MTA	could	utilize	the	existing	24	miles	of	existing	rail	tracks	owned	by	Amtrak,	CSX	and	the	MTA.	Bringing	together	neighborhoods	from	Co-Op	City	in	the	northern	Bronx	to	Bay	Ridge	in	Brooklyn,	passing	through	various	neighborhoods	lacking	public	transit	currently,	the	Triboro	Rx	is	estimated	to	serve	an	initial	daily	ridership	of	100,000	people	(NY	Times	Editorial	Board	2016).		The	RPA’s	report	titled	“The	Triboro”	outlined	the	various	potential	benefits	the	City	and	its	residents	would	gain	from	this	proposal.	Intersecting	17	subway	lines	and	four	commuter	rails,	the	Triboro	would	connect	large	centers	of	retail	and	recreation,	improve	public	health,	and	could	be	a	major	force	to	protect	the	city	during	natural	disasters	like	
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Superstorm	Sandy,	when	underground	rail	is	rendered	inoperable	(Regional	Plan	Association	2017).	
	
	
	
	
							
Figure	Twelve:	The	Regional	Plan	Association,	“The	Triboro”	(2017)		In	the	report,	the	RPA	references	the	success	of	mixing	freight	and	passenger	rail	operations	in	Chicago,	and	also	cites	the	London	Overground:	a	circumferential	rail	system	opened	in	2010	that	carries	more	than	half	a	million	daily	passengers	from	London’s	outer	boroughs	to	the	Tube,	as	precedents	for	why	the	Triboro	proposal	would	work.		The	Triboro	Rx	plan	also	proposed	an	additional	conversion	of	unused	commuter	rail	tracks	to	a	new	subway	line,	connecting	the	Atlantic	Terminal	in	Brooklyn	and	Rosedale	in	Queens	using	existing	Long	Island	Rail	Road	tracks.	These	new	services	would	greatly	improve	transportation	opportunity	and	mobility	for	neighborhoods	in	Brooklyn	and	Queens,	which	are	currently	devoid	of	public	transportation	options.	They	would	also	
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stimulate	the	economy	of	the	various	outer	borough	communities	they	connect,	and	would	alleviate	overcrowding	on	subways	and	buses.			
Bus	Rapid	Transit	to	Patch	Transit	Deserts	Some	organizations	view	proposals	for	subway	expansion	in	outer	boroughs	as	unrealistic	and	instead	argue	for	improved	bus	services.	A	report	by	the	Pratt	Center	for	Community	Development,	a	Brooklyn	community-based	advocacy	organization,	titled	“Mobility	and	Equity	for	New	York’s	Transit	Starved	Neighborhoods”	argues	for	the	implementation	of	Bus	Rapid	Transit	(BRT).	Bus	Rapid	Transit	offers	cities	cost-effective	solution	to	transit-deprived	neighborhoods	that	can	be	implemented	at	a	fraction	of	the	time	and	cost	of	light	rail.	According	to	the	report,	BRT	features	designated	bus	lanes	along	central	medians,	minimizing	traffic	congestion	as	well	as	parking	and	safety	issues;	traffic	signal	priority	and	turn	restrictions,	to	maximize	speed	and	safety;	and	safer	stations	that	provide	real-time	data	and	reduce	loading	and	unloading	time.		
	
Figure	Thirteen:	Pratt	Center	for	Community	Development,	“Mobility	and	Equity	for	New	York’s	
Transit	Starved	Neighborhoods”	(2013)	
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The	report	recommends	eight	new,	full-featured	BRT	corridors	serving	New	York’s	four	outer	boroughs,	selected	on	their	potential	benefits	and	physical	feasibility	for	BRT.	It	suggests	that	these	areas	are	in	particular	need	of	superior	public	transportation	options,	given	recent	population	growth	and	widening	of	income	inequality.	“Many	transit-poor	neighborhoods	that	have	experienced	population	growth	during	the	past	decade	have	also	experienced	declines	in	local	median	incomes,	along	with	increases	in	average	household	size	and	percentage	of	multi-earner	households,”	the	report	states.	“As	it	becomes	less	possible	for	families	to	afford	housing	on	the	income	of	a	single	earner,	households	increasingly	include	extended	families	in	which	several	adults	work	part-time	or	full-time.”		The	Pratt	Center’s	report	also	highlights	recent	changes	in	employment	patterns,	for	which	the	subway	does	not	adequately	serve.	Since	the	subway	system	was	nearly	completed	by	the	Second	World	War,	it	reflects	the	employment	patterns	of	that	time:	where	workers	in	the	outer	boroughs	commuted	to	Manhattan.	Intra-borough	commutes	have	become	increasingly	common,	but	a	lack	of	subway	options	and	underperforming	bus	services	has	made	these	commutes	unbearably	slow.	According	to	the	Behind	the	Curb	study	by	the	Center	for	an	Urban	Future	referenced	in	the	previous	chapter,	New	York’s	outer	boroughs	have	seen	significant	job	growth	over	the	past	two	decades,	while	employment	in	Manhattan	has	declined.	Between	2003	and	2008,	Brooklyn	had	a	bigger	percentage	increase	in	jobs	than	Manhattan	did,	and	during	the	recession	of	2008-2009,	the	Bronx	gained	3,647	jobs	while	Manhattan	lost	100,799	jobs	in	that	one	year	alone	(Center	for	an	Urban	Future	2011).	A	major	force	in	these	changes	is	the	growth	in	healthcare	and	education,	which	have	provided	thousands	of	jobs	in	the	outer	boroughs	over	the	past	few	decades.	
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	 With	the	increased	job	growth	in	the	outer	boroughs,	the	MTA	predicts	significant	increases	in	bus	ridership,	which	will	place	more	pressure	on	the	already	lackluster	city	bus	performance.	Bus	ridership	has	increased	by	60	percent	since	1990,	and	transit	planners	believe	that	future	increases	of	30	percent	or	more	per	decade	are	a	reasonable,	maybe	even	conservative	assumption	(Center	for	an	Urban	Future	2011).	During	this	time	period,	buses	have	become	notorious	for	unpredictable	schedules	due	to	traffic	and	a	lack	of	resources.	Providing	superior	bus	service	to	these	rapidly	growing	industries	is	an	essential	duty	of	the	MTA.			 Pratt’s	report	arguing	for	Bus	Rapid	Transit	claims	that	it	has	the	potential	to	catalyze	communities	in	a	manner	similar	to	streetcars	or	light	rail,	at	a	fraction	of	the	cost	and	time	needed	to	implement.	“New	research	shows	that	systems	incorporating	dedicated	lanes,	well-designed	stations,	and	networked	routes	not	only	provide	the	greatest	improvements	in	travel	time	and	user	satisfaction,”	the	report	states.	“Their	permanence	can	transform	BRT	corridors,	leveraging	residential	and	commercial	density,	economic	revitalization	and	environmental	quality”	(Byron	2013).	Bus	Rapid	Transit	has	the	potential	to	provide	an	efficient	means	of	transportation	for	residents	of	neighborhoods	underserved	by	current	bus	infrastructure,	and	would	also	greatly	improve	the	safety	and	economic	vitality	of	these	communities.	It	would	also	serve	as	a	short-term	solution	to	mediate	a	lack	of	public	transportation	in	the	outer	boroughs,	which	could	in	the	coming	decades	be	complemented	by	an	outer	borough	light	rail,	like	the	Triboro	Rx.	Furthermore,	the	implementation	of	BRT	would	signal	the	City’s	commitment	to	serve	its	most	transit	dependent	citizens	looking	to	get	ahead.		
	 96	
	 Scholars	have	argued	that	the	implementation	of	BRT	could	lead	to	the	gentrification	of	areas	that	previously	had	poor	transit	service	(Zuk	et	al.	2015)	(Brown	2016).	One	of	the	weaknesses	of	the	Pratt	report	is	the	lack	of	attention	given	to	consider	how	their	proposal	could	impact	this	process,	however	there	is	a	mention	in	the	Appendix	of	the	report,	stating	that	“the	experience	in	other	cites	has	been	that	BRT	has	not	triggered	land	speculation	or	gentrification,”	(Byron	2013).	While	its	good	that	the	report	did	have	this	reference,	additional	discussion	of	this	possibility	is	important.																		
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Chapter	Six:	CONCLUSION	
	
	 The	increasing	inaccessibility	of	New	York	City’s	public	transportation	system	has	profound	ramifications	for	the	city’s	working	poor,	who	are	disproportionately	immigrants	and	people	of	color.	Throughout	the	history	of	the	New	York	subway	system,	the	interests	of	those	in	power	have	been	to	maximize	transit	ridership	to	support	the	needs	of	employment	centers	and	industry.	As	jobs	have	shifted	to	the	outer	boroughs,	the	city’s	subway	system	has	become	obsolete	as	a	means	of	transporting	residents	to	their	places	of	work.	Politicians	have	promoted	policies	that	have	further	marginalized	low-income	residents	to	the	fringes	of	the	city’s	transit	system,	isolating	thousands	of	New	Yorkers	from	decent	employment	and	education	opportunities.			 This	thesis	has	argued	that,	through	its	inheritance	from	for-profit	corporations,	the	New	York	City	Metropolitan	Transportation	Authority	(MTA)	has	failed	to	shed	its	for-profit,	capitalist	ideology.	By	devoting	fiscal	resources	to	urban	freeway	projects	and	suburbanization,	civic	leaders	in	the	decades	following	WWII	expressed	a	visceral	priority	that	serving	suburban	commuters	who	are	on	the	whole	wealthier	than	their	urban	counterparts	is	what	is	most	important	to	them.	This	priority	is	particularly	evident	in	the	MTA’s	dedication	to	subsidizing	the	suburban	commuter	rail	at	a	rate	higher	than	the	city’s	mass	transit	systems,	reflecting	an	emphasis	on	the	bottom	line	and	profitability.	I	have	argued	that	the	Metropolitan	Transportation	Authority	operates	in	a	manner	that	views	its	riders	as	consumers	or	customers,	rather	than	as	citizens	deserving	of	transit	service	that	is	affordable	and	serves	their	needs.	In	this	way,	the	MTA	is	an	agent	of	transit	inequity	in	New	York	City.			 	
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The	public	infrastructure	that	urban	planners	and	city	and	state	politicians	create	leaves	behind	a	legacy	that	can	significantly	impact	or	hinder	a	community’s	ability	to	prosper.	In	the	case	of	the	NYC	subway,	there	have	been	various	causes	and	effects	that	have	had	positive	and	negative	reverberations	throughout	the	city.	In	New	York,	historical	urban	renewal	policies	and	suburbanization	divided	the	city,	which	has	been	exacerbated	by	gentrification	in	more	recent	years,	pushing	low-income	communities	further	into	isolated	regions,	deprived	of	decent	access	to	public	transit.	Subway	and	bus	fares	have	raised	dramatically	over	the	past	few	decades,	creating	a	system	that	fails	to	meet	the	needs	of	the	working	poor,	who	are	disproportionately	immigrants	and	people	of	color.			Amongst	the	robust	literature	surrounding	transit	equity	worldwide,	there	is	a	dearth	of	scholarship	that	explores	equity	issues	relating	to	the	New	York	City	subway	system.	Positioning	this	research	in	the	context	of	the	global	literature	on	transit	equity	and	transportation	justice,	I	have	brought	together	considerations	of	citizen-based	grassroots	transit	advocacy	organizing	and	the	importance	of	these	efforts	towards	reforming	New	York’s	transportation	system	to	meet	the	needs	of	all.	By	synthesizing	these	transit	advocacy	movements,	this	research	promotes	the	efficacy	of	community	organizing	as	a	method	to	promote	social	justice	and	equity,	particularly	within	the	public	transportation	planning	process.				 In	order	to	effectively	engage	in	an	intersectional	movement,	transportation	justice	scholarship	must	consider	the	efforts	of	community	organizations	advocating	for	equity	and	fight	for	heightened	inclusion	of	historically	marginalized	voices	in	the	transportation	planning	process.	Congressman	John	Lewis,	renowned	for	his	leadership	during	the	civil	rights	movement,	argues	that	while	explicit	signs	and	policies	discriminating	against	
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people	of	color	have	been	removed,	invisible	signs	still	exist	today.	“Neighborhoods	in	every	major	city	in	America	still	post	invisible	signs	that	say:	‘Poor	People	and	people	of	color	are	not	welcome.’	The	signs	may	be	invisible,	but	the	message	is	real…	When	we	remove	invisible	race	and	class	barriers	that	divide	our	society,	only	then	will	we	have	just	transportation	for	all	Americans,”	(R.	D.	Bullard	and	Johnson	1997).			 Further	research	should	be	conducted	assessing	the	impact	of	transit	inequity	on	isolation	and	economic	stagnation	among	marginalized	communities.	Studies	that	utilize	ethnographic	accounts	are	particularly	convincing,	as	they	bring	abstract	ideas	to	the	forefront	and	personalize	inequality	in	a	way	that	statistics	alone	cannot.	Geographic	Information	Systems	(GIS)	provide	an	effective	tool	to	measure	transit	isolation	as	a	spatial	analysis,	and	future	studies	should	take	advantage	of	the	wealth	of	data	and	statistics	for	New	York	City,	acting	as	a	complement	to	ethnographic	accounts.		This	research	hopes	to	position	itself	in	the	larger	context	of	transit	equity	scholarship	worldwide,	where	it	aspires	to	encourage	scholars	to	work	alongside	community	organizations	to	advocate	for	a	more	equitable	system	of	transit	in	New	York	City	as	soon	as	possible.			 There	is	no	silver	bullet	solution	for	addressing	transit	equity	issues.	Improving	social	services,	such	as	public	transportation,	can	often	result	in	an	appreciation	of	housing	values	and	a	consequential	wave	of	gentrification.	The	introduction	of	Bus	Rapid	Transit	has	also	stimulated	gentrification	for	neighborhoods	that	receive	improved	transit	service,	marking	an	important	question	that	urban	planners	and	transit	advocates	must	make:	how	can	we	improve	the	conditions	of	underserved	communities	without	advancing	processes	of	gentrification	and	displacement?		
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	 By	conducting	this	research	project,	I	had	three	objectives	in	mind.	I	wanted	to	research	the	history	of	the	development	and	management	of	New	York’s	subway	system,	a	legacy	that	I	have	been	interested	in	since	I	was	young.	My	second	goal	was	to	explore	how	my	perceived	inequities	relating	to	public	transportation	in	New	York	City	came	to	be,	and	to	study	the	history	of	policy	decisions	that	created	this	dichotomy	of	transit	resources.	Finally,	my	third	objective	was	to	explore	the	movements	of	citizen-driven,	grassroots	community	organizations	that	are	advocating	for	transit	equity	in	New	York	City,	and	pay	homage	to	their	efforts.	Oftentimes	the	lessons	of	academia	are	weighed	heavily	with	content	that	is	demoralizing	for	their	participants,	leading	to	activist	burnout	and	feelings	of	helplessness.	Through	this	review	of	what	organizations	are	doing	on	the	ground	to	combat	transit	inequity	and	other	injustices,	I	hope	to	encourage	my	audience	to	consider	the	ways	that	we	can	resist	the	wrongdoings	that	we	experience	and	fight	for	what	we	believe	is	right.			 													
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